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Introduction
Mon intérêt pour l'immigration en France a commencé il y a quatre ans, quand j'ai
commencé ma carrière académique à Connecticut College. Le professeur qui a enseigné
mon premier cours de français avait un vif intérêt pour l'actualité, et elle nous a amené
des articles des journaux français (Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur, etc.) fréquemment.
Je savais que l'immigration était un sujet très polémique ici aux Etats-Unis, mais les
articles sur l'immigration que mon professeur nous a présentés me semblaient différents.
En plus d'être une question sociale et politique, j'avais l'impression que l'immigration en
France avait une dimension identitaire. Je ne savais pas exactement comment le définir,
et à ce point-là je n'aurais pas pu l'expliquer. Mais je voulais en savoir davantage.
Maintenant, quatre ans plus tard, je crois que je suis prête à explorer le lien entre
l'immigration en France et l'identité nationale française. Ou plus précisément, je suis
prête à poser les questions nécessaires pour arriver à une réponse provisoire. Parce que la
vérité est qu'il n y a pas de réponse définitive. Il ne sera jamais possible d'offrir une
solution manichéenne, ni pour les nombreux défis que l'immigration présente pour la
France ni pour les multiples défis que la France présente pour l'immigration. Avec le
discours politique, les conflits sociaux, l'aspect identitaire, les discriminations, la
question financière, et les représentations véhiculées par les médias, l'imbroglio est
beaucoup trop compliqué pour des solutions nettes.
J'ai donc trouvé plus prudent de parler des perceptions au lieu de solutions.
Comment est-ce que les français perçoivent leurs populations immigrées d'aujourd'hui?
Comment est-ce qu'ils les ont perçues historiquement? Quels sont les événements qui ont
profondément influencé cette perception, et comment est-ce qu'ils continuent de résonner

4

dans la France contemporaine? Ces sont les questions avec lesquelles j'ai commencé ma
thèse. Elles sont très larges, bien sûr, mais je n'aurais pas pu me limiter à une perspective
unique ou une seule population migratoire. Mes expériences et mon éducation à propos de
l'immigration et l'identité nationale en France ont été vastes, donc je me suis permis
d'aborder cette thèse de manière très vaste aussi. Je crois que la présence d'un discours
honnête et critique est importante, et c'est principalement ce que j'ai essayé de faire dans
cette thèse: analyser la perception et le traitement des immigrés en France d'un œil
critique.
Dans mon premier chapitre, je retrouve les origines de la perception de l'identité
nationale française dans la Révolution de 1789. Il y a tellement de gloire et tellement de
grandes valeurs qui sont automatiquement associées avec la France aujourd'hui, mais d'où
vient cette gloire; d'où viennent ces valeurs indestructibles de "Liberté, Egalité et
Fraternité"? Qui a décidé de recréer et de réinventer la face de la nation après la chute de
l'ancien régime? Les événements de 1789 forment la base d'une identité nationale
profonde et abstraite qui persiste en France aujourd'hui. Pourtant, cette conception de
l'identité nationale est problématique pour les migrants, parce qu'elle ne reconnait pas les
particularités qui sont elles-mêmes le tissu de l'identité personnelle: "[Abstract
individualism] is not the idea that the common nature of individuals is given or already
there, but rather the fact that it is produced inasmuch as particular identities are
relativized and become mediations for the realization of a superior and more abstract
goal." 1

1

Etienne Balibar, as quoted by Wallach Scott, Joan. Parité! Sexual Equality and the
Crisis of French Universalism. 15
5

Dans les années qui ont suivi, La Terreur a établi le lien entre les étrangers et
les criminels pour la première fois. La figure de l'étranger était un bouc émissaire
commode, et toute personne qui n'était pas française a été soupçonnée d'activité contrerévolutionnaire. Les stéréotypes à propos des étrangers ont augmenté pendant les années
napoléoniennes. La succession des guerres a beaucoup élargi l'empire physique de la
France, et avec ces nouveaux territoires sont nés de nouveaux stéréotypes sur les
habitants. La xénophobie et la discrimination sont devenues encore plus répandues dans
la deuxième moitié des années 1800, quand le processus de l'industrialisation a attiré un
afflux d'immigrés sans précédent. Ces immigrés ont été reçus avec réticence par la société
française, qui se croyait racialement et moralement supérieure.
Mon troisième chapitre développe cette notion de la soi-disant "supériorité
française" dans le contexte de l'impérialisme en Afrique. La France a été une des
protagonistes dans la Ruée vers l'Afrique dans les années 1880-1914, et ses conquêtes en
Afrique ont intensifié le sentiment de la supériorité culturelle de la France: "The
relationship between republican France and its colonies generated a specific language
about admission into the French nation and about the meaning of republican citizenship." 2
Le gouvernement a justifié la politique coloniale avec la logique de la "mission
civilisatrice": la France a envahi les pays africains pour venir en aide aux populations
considérées comme primitives, et pour les introduire au mode de vie français. Cette
logique présente l'entreprise comme un acte altruiste et humanitaire, mais ce n'était pas
vraiment le cas. La France a maintenu une présence en Afrique pour son propre bénéfice,
et rien de plus.
2

Lehning, James R. To Be A Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third
Republic. 129
6

A la fin de ce chapitre, je me concentre sur le cas de l'Algérie, parce que les
relations entre France et Algérie étaient très différentes que les relations que la France
avait avec ses autres colonies. L'Algérie (un territoire français depuis 1830) n'était pas
seulement une colonie d'exploitation, mais aussi une colonie de peuplement. Des milliers
de français, ainsi que d'autres européens, se sont installés durablement sur le territoire
algérien. Là, ils ont bénéficiés d'un bon niveau de vie et de droits équivalents à ceux des
français de la métropole: comme François Mittérand a constaté, "L'Algérie, c'était la
France." Mais cette déclaration ne s'appliquait pas du tout á la population indigène: sous
la domination française, les indigènes ont été totalement privés de leurs droits. Ils ont été
exploités et marginalisés dans leur propre société, et leur ressentiment et leur colère
envers la présence française a progressivement augmenté. En 1954, ils ne pouvaient plus
le supporter: la Guerre Franco-Algérienne a commencé.
Le chapitre quatre est consacré à la guerre en Algérie, qui a duré huit ans jusqu'à
1962. Les français combattaient les rebelles algériens, qui s'étaient désignés comme le
"Front National de Libération" (FLN). La guerre, caractérisée par la brutalité et le
terrorisme, a été extrêmement dure, et elle a laissé une grande tache dans la mémoire
nationale française. Du point de vue psychologique, cette guerre est une des plus
traumatisantes que la France a jamais connue: l'armée française a systématiquement
torturé ses prisonniers politiques en Algérie. Les soldats ont poursuivi agressivement les
membres du FLN, et quand ils les ont trouvés, ils les ont torturés et exécutés. Il y avait
des milliers de morts, et il n'est toujours pas clair combien sont morts de la torture. Le
FLN a également torturé, mais c'est le souvenir de la torture française qui reste toujours
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dans l'inconscient national: "The loss of this territory, considered as a 'national' territory,
is still felt like an amputation in the collective unconscious." 3
Après la guerre, il est devenu encore plus difficile pour le gouvernement et la
société d'intégrer les immigrés et les réfugiés qui sont venus en France. La plupart des
immigrés qui sont arrivés après 1962 étaient membres des anciennes colonies françaises
en Afrique du Nord. Ces immigrés se sont trouvés face à des discriminations intenses et
profondes de la part des français, et ils nourrissaient un même ressentiment profond en ce
qui concerne leurs expériences coloniales. Il y avait donc des tensions sous-jacentes qui
sont entrées en jeu dans la France post-coloniale, et le résultat a été une série de lois
codifiant l'immigration dans les années 1990: le Traité de Maastricht en 1992, les Lois
Pasqua en 1993, et les Accords Schengen en 1995.
Ces lois sont représentatives d'un changement dans la perception de l'immigration,
pas seulement en France mais dans toute l'Union Européenne. La redéfinition des
frontières et de l'espace commun selon les termes des lois suggère que les immigrés (et
les étrangers en général) ont commencé à être perçus comme une menace pour la sécurité
nationale. Les Accords Schengen, par exemple, permettent aux ressortissants de l'Union
Européenne de traverser les frontières sans papiers de l'identité. Dans ce sens-là, les
frontières européennes sont devenues plus fluides. Mais pour les immigrés, c'est le
contraire: avec les Accords Schengen, les frontières extérieures ont été renforcées
idéologiquement. Une barrière évidente s'est établie entre "nous" (les français) et "eux"
(les immigrés), et ce binarisme allait se révéler très difficile à surmonter.

3

Stora, Benjamin. "Histoire et Société: La guerre d'Algérie à la télévision rançaise."
Interview by Eugénie Barbezat.
8

Prisonniers de ces perceptions qui les avaient définis a priori, les immigrés de
l'Afrique du Nord et leurs enfants devaient faire face à un grand nombre de défis. La
même France qui se disait prête à défendre "la Fraternité" et "l'Egalité" avec son dernier
souffle ne cessait de les marginaliser et les rejeter. La notion française de la citoyenneté a
laissé très peu d'espace pour ceux qui n'étaient pas "français de souche," et les immigrés
continuaient à avoir du mal à trouver leur place dans la société. Mais cela n'est pas de
leur faute: le problème n'est pas seulement un problème d'intégration ou un "problème
d'immigration," mais une véritable crise identitaire pour la France: "Some who write on
the subject have suggested that hospitality as a French virtue has disappeared, crossed off
the list of Republican principles by the government itself. This becomes, then, a question
of French national identity, and not just an isolated political issue about immigration." 4
Dans le nouveau millénium, cette crise a été catapultée en première ligne de la
scène politique. Avant toute chose, l'immigration est considérée comme un enjeu
politique, une perspective qui ne tient pas compte de l'expérience nuancée de l'immigré.
Et malgré la nature complexe de l'immigration en France, la société française continue de
chercher une "solution" blanche et noire. "L'affaire du foulard" en 2004 et les émeutes
des banlieues en 2005 et 2008 ont incarné l'affrontement idéologique que l'identité
nationale est en train de connaître, soulignant les tensions qui existent toujours entre la
théorie et l'application. L'idée que l'uniformité (l'universalisme) assure l'égalité
fonctionne théoriquement, mais pas dans la vie réelle.
Afin que l'immigration cesse d'être perçue automatiquement comme un
"problème," il faut que la France trouve une façon d'accepter les particularités culturelles
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Rosello, Mireille. Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest. 28-29
9

(religieuses, sexuelles, etc.) dans sa définition de l'identité nationale. Pour cela, je
suggère qu'il faudrait également un nouveau vocabulaire pour parler de l'identité
nationale, l'immigration, et l'intégration; un vocabulaire dépolitisé et sans connotations
ou associations préalables. Enfin, je crois que la France doit continuer à faire face aux
événements traumatiques de son passé. La honte et la culpabilité sont un fardeau lourd
dont le pays doit se défaire avant de pouvoir progresser.

10

I. L'Origine de l'Universalisme Française: National Unity and the French Revolution
The one defining event in French history that can be identified as the origin of
contemporary French universalist thought is the Revolution of 1789. This monumental
event in French history changed the very fabric of the country, from the socio-political
structure down to the very ways in which the French people defined themselves.
Before the advent of the Revolution, France was governed under a monarchy. As
with most monarchies, this form of government did not afford the French people much of
a voice. The only input in government matters that the people had was through the
Estates General, an assembly comprised of representatives from three different groups:
the clergy, the nobility, and the peasant class. 5 By the late 1780s, however, the people
found their representation in government to be sorely lacking: the Estates General had not
been called since 1614. Discontentment with the monarchy as a form of government (as
well as discontentment with Louis XIV as a ruler more generally) began to grow. The
monarchy came across as being too disconnected from the rest of French society, and,
worse, indifferent to the hardships that a large percentage of the population faced. Recent
involvement in the Seven Years' War left France's treasuries emptier than usual, sparking
an increase in tariffs on widely consumed everyday products. The French people resented
this general increase in prices extremely, because a series of unsuccessful harvests had
already created a food shortage within the lower classes. The State was getting richer
while the people were starving, and they didn't have any say whatsoever in how the
matter was being handled. It was this combination of factors that gave rise to the French

5

All background information on the French Revolution was obtained from the
Encyclopedia Britannica online version. Entries: "France" and "The French Revolution."
11

Revolution. 6 The people reached their breaking point on the morning of July 14th, 1789,
when they flooded the streets of central Paris. They targeted the Bastille, a building that
had come to represent the old regime and the values associated with it. This event marked
the beginning of the Revolution: the advent of a new age for France.
This new age was first and foremost characterized by large-scale ideological
shifts: the out-and-out rejection of the values associated with the ancien régime made a
complete redefinition of national identity and self-perception necessary. This task of
redefinition fell to the politicians, philosophers, and others in positions of political
power. Not wanting to fall back into the social and political structures of the ancien
régime, it was of the utmost importance to these men to completely reconstruct the idea
of the nation in the imaginations of the French people. Fabre d'Eglantine, an actor and
politician during the Revolution, acknowledged this project, proclaiming, "One must take
hold of a man's imagination and govern it." 7 The French people were vary wary of
anything that represented social privilege or distinction after the Revolution, so a large
part of the task that men like d'Eglantine were undertaking was to reconstruct the nation
as a place where universal equality was prioritized and respected.
It was here that what Pierre Rosanvallon refers to as the "reign of abstraction" 8
made its debut. To combat the values and ideals of the old regime, the politicians had to
represent very abstract entities like the nation and the individual in powerful ways. The
way they saw it, if the French people were united in a universal way of thinking about

6

Historians today are not entirely in agreement about what caused the French Revolution,
but these are some of the commonly agreed-upon factors.
7
Rosanvallon, Pierre. The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France Since the
Revolution. 21
8
Rosanvallon, 65
12

their nation, and about the relationship of the individual to the nation, social and political
equality would follow. Social scientist Joan Wallach Scott discusses this presumed
correlation of abstraction to equality in her novel, Parité!: "The abstractions [of the
nation and the individual] allowed the revolutionaries to substitute the idea of formal
political equality for the corporate hierarchies of the Old Regime and republican unity for
the rule of kings." 9 This quote speaks to the importance that such abstractions were given
in counteracting the weight and ingrainedness of the past. Author and historian Pierre
Rosanvallon, whose work focuses largely on the French Revolution, acknowledges this
point as well: "To combat the 'Gothic colossus' of the old world, it was necessary to find
a new and 'invincible colossus' to replace it, namely, the nation." 10
As such, the idea of the nation attained a new importance in French life. The
politicians and Revolutionary thinkers reconstructed the Republic as a highly abstract,
all-important, singular entity to which the French citizens owed their unwavering
allegiance. Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne, a Calvinist pastor who was very active in the
political sphere, stated that "In the nature of things, there is but one body, which is the
nation." 11 Poet André Chénier subscribed to a similarly glorified vision of the French
nation: "Imprudent and unfortunate is the state in which a variety of associations are
formed. Happy is the country in which there is no association but the state, no corps but
the fatherland, and no interest but the common good." 12 Chénier's quote in particular
highlights the connection between the state and what he calls "the common good." This
type of thinking is exactly what the politicians and philosophers of the time wanted to
9

Wallach Scott, 15
Rosanvallon, 73
11
Rosanvallon
12
Rosanvallon
10

13

instill in the general public. Revolutionary thinkers believed that creating a glorified
image of the nation in which they all lived would help unite the people, thereby ensuring
universal equality and tranquility among them.
Another thing that the Revolutionary thinkers like Jean-Paul Marat hoped to
achieve in promoting a glorified, abstract vision of the nation was a collective public
opinion. If the people all thought about the French nation in the same way, and if they all
felt the same way about their relationship to the state, the principles of Liberté and
Egalité could not be compromised: "Nothing is more important for a victory of Liberty,
for the happiness of the Nation, than to enlighten the citizens as to their rights, and to
create a public opinion." 13 This desire on the part of the politicians to construct a public
opinion, and in doing so to create a united, indivisible nation, was a powerful one. And,
luckily for them, it was not very difficult to realize. In light of the way the feudal system
had been structured, there was a great deal of anxiety about exclusivity after the
Revolution among the French people in general. So forming a collective public opinion
was right in line with what they needed to do to eradicate these anxieties.
The readiness with which the people embraced the voicing of a public opinion is
evidenced by the rapid proliferation of publications (newspapers, newsletters, and
pamphlets) after the Revolution. In the 1780s, there were scarcely three-dozen daily
newspapers circulating throughout Paris. But between 1789 and 1792, the number of
newspapers distributed in Paris shot up to over 500. 14 This figure is astonishing given the
short four-year time period in which the increase occurred. The printing press had already

13

Najedk, Carl: "Revolutionizing Rousseau: An Analysis of the Political Thought of
Jean-Paul Marat, Georges Jacques Danton, and Maximilien Robespierre." 18
14
Hunt, Lynn. "The Rhetoric of Revolution in France." 78-94
14

been around for nearly four hundred years, so it was not the recent introduction of a new
technique that was behind the surge: only an event like the French Revolution that really,
profoundly affected French attitudes toward unity and collective thought could account
for it. A similar phenomenon occurred with the production of plays: more than ever,
actors were cast, scripts were generated, and crowds flocked to playhouses. It was, as
Hunt aptly states, "a deluge of words," 15 produced specifically for the public (and, in the
case of plays, enjoyed in public). Inspired by the power of the mass movement that made
the Revolution a success, the French people were sharing their ideas and opinions on a
larger scale than ever before. Word by word, phrase by phrase, and slogan by slogan, the
development of the press and the theater began to define a new national identity in which
universal thought and collective opinion were of the utmost importance.
Gatherings known as "Revolutionary festivals" provided social, interactive spaces
in which the French people could develop their fledgling national identity. The festivals
took place out of doors, and, in keeping with the times, were political in nature. Different
political groups (for example, Jacobins) or different social tiers (for example, Aristocrats)
would organize their own festivals, bringing people together to engage in dialogue and
social interaction. Because of the way that the festivals were organized, they are
reflective of ongoing social and political enclaves during the Revolution. But their larger
significance as a means of developing the greater French "whole" (the unified society that
the Revolution gave rise to) has been discussed rather recently by a variety of researchers
and historians. Mona Ozouf, author of Festivals and the French Revolution, provides a
clear explanation of the festivals' larger significance: "The purpose of the festival was to

15

Hunt, 78
15

stage a harmonious society in which all differences were temporarily suspended. It
instituted a sort of sacrament of social unity, melding bodies and hearts into a unanimous
ensemble." 16 Ozouf sees revolutionary festivals not as highlighting individual differences,
but as a mirror image of the group mentality that the Revolution gave rise to among the
French people; a "self-representation" 17 of the unity and social cohesion they were trying
to achieve. In this way, the festival was a means of exploring, and above all, of affirming
the value of the changing French national identity.
These phenomena illustrated the development of a new national self-definition that
was predicated on social unity and consensus within the national body. This development
was accompanied by shifts in the way that the French people perceived their own
citizenship. Much in the same way that the idea of the nation had been glorified, the
notion of the individual as a citizen was glorified and abstracted. The politicians and
Revolutionary thinkers wanted the French people not only to revere the nation and to
respect the sanctity of liberty and equality, but also to reflect on their own individual
relationships to the state. Citizenship was no longer just a mere title conferred upon a
person at birth; instead, it took on a moral dimension, bringing with it duties and
obligations that the French people were expected to live up to. Historian and Professor
Jennifer Ngaire Heuer puts the development of this idea of moral citizenship into its
historical context: "The...radicalization of the Revolution and the violence of the Terror
in 1793 and 1794 expanded both the rights and obligations associated with membership in

16
17

Rosanvallon, 22
Hesse, Carla. "Review: Festivals and the French Revolution." 232
16

the nation. Citizenship was...an individual act of will, an expression of personal
patriotism and allegiance to the nation."

18

Wallach Scott links this idea of moral citizenship interestingly with the political
proceedings at the time. After the Revolution, the abstract body of the Assemblée
Nationale took the place of the actual, concrete body of the king. 19 For practicality's sake,
the Assemblée was to be comprised of a number of representatives. But instead of
representing specific social factions (as in the past with the Estates General), these
representatives would be there to represent the metaphorical body of the people as a
united whole. According to this vision of universal representation in government, then, it
does not matter who fills the role of representative. The representatives are not there as
individuals with specific economic, religious, or sexual qualities, but as faceless "filters"
for the voice of the rest of the French nation. This dissociation from particularity that the
individual undergoes in the political sphere is at the heart of the way that the concept of
the individual changed after the French Revolution. The importance of the individual in
the political sphere no longer lay in specific traits that associated the individual with a
particular group, but in the function he or she could play as a French citizen. In Wallach
Scott's words, "The ability of any citizen to stand for, or represent, the nation derived
from the understanding of political individuals as abstracted from their social attributes-wealth, family, occupation, religion, and profession." 20 The politicians and thinkers of the
Revolutionary period were no longer interested in the political importance of the
individual as a shareholder, as a father, as a woman, as a mason, as a Catholic, or as a
18

Heuer, Jennifer. The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary
France. 4
19
Wallach Scott, 13
20
Wallach Scott, 13
17

Jew. They were solely interested in the individual as an abstract, dutiful citoyen de la
République.
This divorcing of particularity and of particular traits from the abstract citizen and
individu was the beginning of a fundamental rift between the political and the social
worlds. As Rosanvallon asserts, particularity was not important in the political world: "In
democracy, 'the people' has no form. The body politic has no density; it is simply
number, that is, a force composed of equals, of individuals equivalent before the law." 21
And indeed, particularity was not only not important in the political world, but it
threatened the very nature of the national unity that the politicians sought to create. For
them, national unity and equality depended absolutely on the abstractions of the
individual and the nation, so to see individuals in any way other than abstractly was to
sacrifice the national unity that the Revolution had helped build. In contrast to the
political world, the social world was much more concrete. The "disparate and divisive
realities" 22 that the political world denied were still important in the social world, as
particularities and distinguishing traits are the tools by which humans gauge their social
interactions. One could not enter the family sphere, for example, and claim that he or she
was not a mother, or a brother, or a grandfather, but a French citizen. Social realities did
not allow for the kind of abstraction that the political world allowed for, and an
opposition between the two was thus established.
It is this conflict between the concrete social world and the abstract political
world that makes French universalism wholly unique: "The abstractions of individual and
nation were the foundations on which theories of representation were built; they also
21
22

Rosanvallon, 72
Wallach Scott, 13
18

were the key to a distinctively French concept of universalism--one that rested on an
opposition between the political and the social, the abstract and the concrete." 23 As one
might imagine, the tension between the social and political world that the use of
abstraction created was problematic in a variety of ways. For one, it left the French
people feeling (to employ Rosanvallon's word) disoriented: "[There was] a certain
sociological stupefaction in the face of universal suffrage, as the inception of such a
radically desubstantialized world left even its most ardent champions anxiously
disoriented." 24 Though they were probably not aware of it at the time, the French people
were being essentially pulled in two directions: they belonged at once to the political
world, in which each individual was highly abstracted, and to the social world, in which
distinguishing social traits and characteristics continued to be relevant. It was not clear
which "world" they were supposed to use as a referent for defining themselves.
Rosanvallon observes that, as the Revolution grew more and more chaotic and
"disorienting," social bonds (family and friendship) attained an elevated importance:
"The family was indeed celebrated as never before in novels and plays as well as in music
and painting. The virtues of intimacy and closeness, the pleasures of the home, and the
warmth of friendship took on unprecedented importance in this period." He then quotes
directly from Robespierre to strengthen his argument: "It is telling that Robespierre
called for the erection of altars to 'divine friendship.'" 25 He posits that this elevated
importance of family and friendship was the way that the French people "compensate[d]
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for the abstract nature of the bond of citizenship," 26 which they could not directly relate
to on an emotional level in their personal lives. Rosanvallon's argument for a correlation
between the unrelatability of abstraction and the importance of family is highly plausible,
but he does acknowledge that not many historians have established this link.
It does seem, however, that the people used the family model to make sense of the
abstractions associated with the new national political structure. As was the case with
most other representations of identity during the Revolutionary period, the politicians
were the ones who provided them with this framework. In the new French Constitution of
1795 (in a document entitled "The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and of a
Citizen"), the politicians drew from the lexicon of the family to help define the abstract
notion of the citizen. Article 4 under the heading "Duties" reads as follows: "No man is a
good citizen if he is not a good son, good father, good brother, good friend, and good
husband." 27 References to the nation as a "great family" 28 also popped up frequently in
political rhetoric. It is interesting here to observe the intersection of political and social
terminology. Though the politicians abstracted the notions of the nation and the citizen,
they still sought concrete social terms to describe them. And ultimately, this was an
effective technique: using the language of the family to "explain" these abstractions made
them more accessible to the French people.
Where comprehension continued to escape them was in the way that women
figured into the abstracted vision of the individual. According to Wallach Scott, "abstract
individuals were commensurable and interchangeable units, possessing in common only
26
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that independent rationality upon which political life was thought to depend." 29 Social
particularities did not factor into the equation at all: they were irrelevant in the political
sphere. Every individual, then, regardless of sex or gender, should have been given an
equal chance to participate in all aspects of political life. But this was curiously not the
case. The Revolutionaries aspired to an idealistic vision of a national body governed
equally by all French people, but in the end it was men, not women, who were afforded
the rights and privileges of citizenship. The question, most simply put, is how did this
happen? Egalité was a highly valorized concept during the Revolution, so it is baffling
that the rights and privileges it entailed did not ultimately extend to women. It is even
more baffling when Hunt's argument about patriarchy and patriarchs (as presented by
Heuer) is taken into account. Before the Revolution, the monarch was widely referred to
as the "père de la patrie," the father of the country. So when Louis XVI was executed, it
was tantamount to executing a father figure: a strange kind of parricide. Summarizing
Hunt's argument, Heuer describes a parallel between American and French republican
imagery: "She [Hunt] contends that whereas American republican imagery celebrated the
father, French revolutionaries distrusted patriarchs of all kinds." 30 Such a fundamental
distrust of patriarchal figures on the part of the Revolutionaries should logically have led
to a subsequent glorification--or at the very least, incorporation--of women into the
political sphere. Why did this not happen?
The lack of sex and gender equality during the Revolutionary period is something
that is still widely discussed among today's historians. Touching on the topic,
Rosanvallon quotes Abbé Sièyes, a clergyman and extremely active politician during the
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Revolutionary period: "'Husband and wife are but a single political person and can never
be anything else, although they may be two civil persons.' If women did not vote, he went
on to explain, it was for 'the simple reason that no one wants to count the same vote
twice.'" 31 Sièyes seems to be inferring that the reason that women were not extended the
same political rights as men (or indeed, any political rights) is because they were too
closely tied to the family. A woman's domain was purely domestic, and any crossover
into the world of politics was simply unfathomable. A diatribe directed towards a group
of women who entered a political assembly in the late 1700s makes this division between
women and the domestic and men and the political painfully clear: "'Since when is it
permitted to give up one's sex?' thundered Pierre Gaspard-Chaumette to a group of
women who dared to enter the Convention. 'Is it to men that nature confided domestic
cares? Has she given us breasts to feed our children?'" 32
Based on Gaspard-Chaumette's fiery reaction, women's presence in the political
sphere was not only unfathomable, but anger inspiring as well. And according to the
writings of Rousseau, this was exactly the problem: "There is no parity between the two
sexes as a consequence of sex...in a commerce that is too intimate...we [men] lose both
our morals and our constitution." 33 Rousseau held that the political space was necessarily
a rational and objective space that was incompatible with the emotionality of women.
Introducing women into the political space would be detrimental to the male politicians
because women's "volatility" would inhibit men's capacity to make moral, objective
political decisions. Wallach Scott links this type of revolutionary thinking back to the
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immense abstraction that French thinkers and politicians used in defining the concepts of
the individual and the nation: "The reasons for excluding women from citizenship were
offered in sets of binary oppositions that posited women in terms of the concrete, the
emotional, and the natural (hence not susceptible to abstraction) and men in terms of
reason and politics (hence operating entirely in the realm of abstraction)." 34 Women were
thus not excluded from political life just because they would be a distraction to the men.
The terms by which women were defined and perceived--"the concrete, the emotional,
and the natural"--were in direct opposition with the abstractions of the political world.
This inconsistency in the abstract model was of crucial importance. Abstracting
the notion of the individual and divorcing the individual from social particularities in the
political sphere was supposed to guarantee universal equality among the French citizens.
But women, because of their association with the natural, physical, and emotional world,
were fundamentally incompatible with this abstract universal model, or universalisme.
Though the politicians and philosophers did not realize it at the time, this problem had
ominous implications for France: "Women's exclusion was not just about eliminating
women's influence. It also served a major symbolic function as a reminder of the
existence of irreducible difference--unresolveable antagonism within the national
body." 35 It was the first sign that the universalist model upon which post-Revolutionary
France had been reinvented was flawed: it did not guarantee the universal equality that
the revolutionaries intended that it should.
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II. La Naissance de l'Etranger: The Terror, the Conquests of Napoleon, and 19th
Century Industrialization
Though women were the first and most prominent group to suffer political and
social injustices because of the flawed universalist model, they were not the only group.
Foreigners and (as they were referred to at the time) émigrés living in France also faced
extreme xenophobia and limitations on their rights.
As William Rogers Brubaker points out, this was a new phenomenon for France:
before the Revolution, citizenship, and the particularity of being foreign-born or having
foreign-born parents, did not hold much importance. "This formal legislative delimitation
of the citizenry was unknown in the territorial states of medieval and early modern
Europe. Citizenship remained inchoate." 36 In other words, the boundaries between nationstates, that render things like foreignness and citizenship important and relevant in the
first place, were not developed to the extent that these qualities really mattered in
political life. Under the monarchy, people were more likely to care about social class and
religious affiliation than geographical foreignness.
Foreigners were even given certain advantages under the Old Regime that the
native-born were not. Skilled immigrant workers were welcomed into the country
eagerly, where they enjoyed advantages and privileges that often surpassed any
advantages or privileges that were extended to the native-born French. The King also had
no qualms about placing foreigners in important positions in his cabinet: "The personal
guard of the King was composed of foreigners; [and] some high officials....were
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foreigners." 37 Even in the period directly following the initial 1789 uprising, foreignness
was not polemic or widely discussed. In fact, it was quite the opposite: foreigners
continued to be openly invited into the country. An excerpt from a political address by
Bertrand Barère in August of 1790 evokes the optimism that most politicians shared
regarding the presence of foreigners in France: "So let foreigners come to find in France
a homeland; let them live here, let them enjoy liberty while they are alive...in paying our
taxes, [the immigrants] will increase the mass of public riches, will augment our
industry...and finish by adopting free France as their patrie." 38 In 1789 and 1790, then,
immigration was regarded as an economic and political advantage. Foreign labor and the
creation of new industries would generate revenue within the new Republic, and the
migrants' eventual naturalization would add to the pool of French citizens and increase
the country's overall power and status.
All of this changed, however, in the years that followed. Foreignness was no
longer approached with the same political and social indifference that it had been under
the monarchy and in the first two years of the Revolution. It became instead grounds for
divisiveness, and was fringed with negative connotations. The political crisis and the
involvement in wars leading up to the Second Republic and the Terror of 1793 created
concerns about national security. The revolutionaries' fear of an invasion (or, more
generally, of counter-revolutionary activity that would upset the freedom they had so
desperately been working for) made for a political climate that was turbulent at best.
Paranoia ran high, and foreigners, marked by physical difference, were easy targets.
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Suspicious of counter-revolutionary activity abroad, people began spinning conspiracy
theories, denouncing one another on the basis of supposed involvement in a foreign-based
plot against the French nation. Foreignness thus became associated with national enmity
and dissent with the revolutionary project: "'Foreigner' (étranger) was a potent term. It
had a multitude of connotations, encompassing both those who were non-French
and...those defined as political and social enemies of the revolutionary nation." 39
As a result of these newfound associations, foreigners became subject to a whole
slew of political restrictions and invasive measures. A large portion of these measures
revolved around government surveillance and monitoring, designed to alert the French
revolutionaries to any unusual or suspect behavior on the foreigners' part. They could be
ordered by government officials of police to produce their identification documents at the
drop of a hat, and they were no longer allowed to participate in political gatherings or
public affairs. A striking example of this type of exclusion came when famous
pamphleteer Thomas Paine, who had been officially elected to the National Convention
years before, was then expelled from it on Christmas day of 1793. 40 Even Paine's
profound involvement in and support for the revolutionary project did not exempt him
from being targeted because he was English.
But as bad as surveillance and exclusion from political bodies was, there was one
measure that was unarguably worse. On April 15th of 1794, the government ordered the
expulsion of all étrangers from "Paris, maritime towns, and military strongholds." 41
Given that the term étranger had taken on multiple meanings, expulsions were also
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targeted at those who were suspected of being enemies of the State in general. The fact
that those of foreign origin or foreign birth fell automatically into this category is telling:
it was racist, xenophobic nationalism at its worst.
Given the severity of the situation, it is not surprising that these expulsions did
not go uncontested. The Committee of Public Safety (the political body that ordered the
expulsion) was immediately inundated with floods of appeals. The so-called "étrangers"
wanted to remain where they were: many had been living on French soil for long periods
of time, and had learned to call the country their home. Many also did not have any kind
of substantial life to go back to. Some of them had even come close to fulfilling or had
already fulfilled the requirements for legal French citizenship (mostly through marriage).
Even if they were not technically French citizens, many had been active participants in
the Revolution, and on this basis felt they should be afforded all of the rights and
privileges of citizenship: "They also contended that regardless of their origins or juridical
status, they had acted as patriotic French citizens and should be treated as such." 42 Very
rarely did these appeals result in actual exemptions from the order for expulsion. As
German Law professor Friedrich Meyer wrote, "Sixty-two thousand foreigners went...in
order to secure exemptions and be permitted to stay in Paris. But, after a severe
examination, barely a tenth of these petitioners obtained a favourable response." 43
The contrast between this hostile attitude toward foreigners and the tolerant,
welcoming attitude that existed up until 1790 is clearly very striking: an "abrupt shift
from xenophilia to xenophobia, from ostentatious hospitality to harsh repression." 44 And
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there does not seem to be one particular, isolated event that occasioned such a swift and
drastic change in attitude. What, then, was the reason that the regard for foreigners
changed so strongly and so rapidly? Rogers Brubaker's compelling answer centers around
the development of the modern definition of citizenship. Before the Revolution, the idea
of the nation-state as a sovereign political entity simply did not exist. This means that, by
default, formal political rights and the idea of national citizenship did not exist before the
Revolution either. Political theory and practice had simply not progressed to the point
that these concepts were fully developed in peoples' minds. But the Revolution, according
to Rogers Brubaker, "brought these development together on a national level for the first
time." 45
As a consequence of this kind of conceptual solidification of the nation-state, the
definition of the foreigner took a definite, concrete shape. The counter-point to the
concept of the citizen became, by default, the foreigner: "By inventing the national
citizen...the Revolution simultaneously invented the modern figure of the foreigner.
Henceforth citizen and foreigner would be correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive
categories." 46 No longer could foreigners be considered to be on the same tier as actual,
bona fide French citizens. As Michael Rapport writes, "People born outside France had
other loyalties and obligations, so only French people could enjoy full rights in France.
Thus French citizens were differentiated from foreigners." 47 It was yet another lapse in
the equality that French universalisme was supposed to guarantee.
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The distinction between citizens and foreigners continued to play an important
role in French politics in the 19th century. It was not, however--at least initially--as
severe and as condemning a distinction as it had been during the Terror. In 1799,
Napoleon Bonaparte, who had steadily gained power and recognition through years of
military service, carried out a successful coup d'état. Overthrowing the Le Directoire,
Napoleon and his collaborators established the French Consulat. The Consulat was for all
intents and purposes a provisional government that concentrated the executive power in
the hands of just a few men, the most powerful of which was Napoleon himself. As the
Premier consul, he had virtually unlimited power to change the Constitution and govern
as he pleased. In 1802 he was declared "consul for life," 48 and in 1804 he was made more
powerful still: he was crowned the Emperor of France. 49
In terms of foreign policy, Napoleon's reign was a political and moral mélange. On
the one hand, historians almost universally acknowledge the lasting impact that the
Napoleonic Code had on French international law. He established a number of laws
surrounding immigration and the naturalization process that are still (at least, in essence)
in effect today. Some of these laws are important purely from a procedural and pragmatic
standpoint, such as the one pertaining to admission à domicile: "A foreigner who wanted
to become French was obliged to obtain permission from the government to establish
himself in France." 50 These kinds of controls on who can enter a country on a permanent
or long-term basis are now standard in modern immigration policy. Other Napoleonic
laws are important because they constitute groundbreaking advances in immigrant rights.
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One law helped children of immigrant or emigrant parents secure their right to French
citizenship: "All born of a French father, inside or outside French territory, were declared
to be French; children born in France of a foreign father could claim French citizenship
status when they reached the age of majority." 51 Another law ensured that foreigners
residing on French territory, regardless of whether or not they had legally obtained
citizenship yet, were to be extended the same civil rights as the French.
This kind of legal awareness of human rights where immigrants were concerned
seems highly contradictory in the context of Napoleon's foreign policy. First and
foremost (at least, in popular modern American memory), Napoleon is remembered for
his territorial conquests and warmongering. And indeed, these associations are not
inaccurate. But the fair and equal treatment of foreign populations residing in France was
actually in full accordance with the Napoleonic Legal Code: "[Napoleon's system]
remained true, from first to last, to conceptions of civil equality and human rights with
which the oppression or extermination of a group...would have been utterly
incompatible." 52 This was written into the Code, and so from a legal standpoint was not at
all anomalous. But immigration policy and immigrant rights were far from being the sole
focus of Napoleon's foreign policy, and it would be misguided to qualify his legacy solely
based on these laws. As Pieter Geyl very eloquently states, "Methods of compulsion and
atrocities are inseparable from the character of the dictator and conqueror, and we shall
see that Napoleon incurred bitter reproaches, at home and abroad, for some of his acts." 53
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Geyl's words speak to the manner in which Napoleon regarded other cultures.
Driven by an insatiable desire for French hegemony, Napoleon's armies invaded
European country after country after country. Owing to his vast military experience,
Napoleon was a tactical genius, and France acquired territory extremely rapidly: "As
Napoleon waged war with most of Europe, the French territorial empire expanded; at its
height in 1812 it included France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the Italian peninsula,
and many central and eastern European lands." 54 Napoleon truly believed that the French
culture and the French way of life were superior to any other, and that his efforts would
eventually result in a harmonious, untouchable Europe united around France and French
values. Summarizing what Napoleon himself wrote about his political project in Le
Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène (1823) 55, Geyl writes: "Had [Napoleon] been allowed to go
his own way, or had he remained victorious, Europe would have become a federation of
free peoples, grouped round enlightenment and fortunate France in an eternal peace." 56
These words paint a highly glorified and idealized picture of what Napoleon was
doing. In actuality, he viewed other countries--and, by extension, peoples--as nothing
more than political tools. He measured their worth in terms of strategy and power: how
much power he would gain through a specific country's acquisition and what kind of a
strategic military advantage the country's location could give him. It is this approach to
foreign policy that had a lasting negative impact on French/immigrant relations. By
assuming French cultural superiority, Napoleon effectively paved the way for his citizens
(or, more accurately, his subjects) to feel the same way. Because the French had been told
54

Heuer, 123
An 1823 compilation of Napoleon's various writings by Emmanuel-AugusteDieudonné, Le Compte de Las Cases
56
Geyl, 24
55

31

time and time again by Napoleon that they were the superior European nation, they
internalized this sentiment: "French vanity, too, enjoyed the superiority which Bonaparte
gave [them] over the rest of Europe." 57 This perspective remained with the French people
even after Napoleon's reign had passed, working itself into the fabric of French national
identity in subtle and complex ways.
This sort of awareness of what the French perceived to be their own cultural
superiority is one of the reasons why immigration was met with so much hostility at the
end of the 1800s. By contrast, immigrants and foreigners were not a political or social
concern at the beginning of the century. As was the case in many Western cities, the 19th
century was a time of immense industrial and economic development for France. The
agricultural economy grew and thrived, creating a population that was distributed mostly
in rural areas. But for the first time, it was a mobile population. The construction and
expansion of France's railway system helped facilitate communication and connectivity
among the people. According to historian Robert Tombs, the decade spanning 1840-1850
was a particularly significant one for this kind of growth and development: "The 1840s
were 'decisive years,' a time of record industrial expansion...with the growth of some
large mechanized units (for example, in engineering, metallurgy, and cotton) and
improvements in banking, transport, and education." 58
Factories and industrial production continued to expand in the latter part of the
19th century. This had the effect of drawing more and more people to France's major
cities: Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, and Lille. Much of the movement was internal: French
people and families who decided to make the transition from a rural life to an urban one.
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There were also some instances of what James Lehning refers to as "urban workers," 59
individuals who retained their homes in rural areas and pursued only seasonal or
temporary work in the city. But some of the increase in urban population was due to
immigration. The combination of the growing industrial economy and the unusually low
birth rate in France created a real need for foreign labor, to which the international
community eagerly responded. Immigrating to France was an appealing prospect for a
number of reasons: readily available jobs, a developing economy, and a chance to live in
a country that was both beautiful and sophistiquée. Through a combination of political
power and the production of luxury items (Lyons silks, furniture, clocks, jewellery,
books, and clothing60), France had developed "a valuable reputation for fashion and
quality" 61 that was alluring to immigrants. Moving to France, getting a job, and being a
part of the exciting and upscale French lifestyle would be a dream come true.
The reality of what immigrants were met with, however, was far less rosy than
what they had imagined. The major French cities (Paris in particular) were rapidly
becoming overcrowded and dirty. The cities' infrastructures--housing, transportation,
sanitation maintenance--had not developed to a level which could support the evergrowing urban population. 62 As a result, living spaces were often small, cramped, and
unclean. Rodent infestations, crime, and disease were common. In the 1850s and 60s
Paris also had a real problem with prostitution. It is this squalid urban setting that serves
as the backdrop for novelist Emilie Zola's Nana. Besides having to contend with what
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really were miserable living conditions, immigrants and immigration in general was
becoming somewhat of a (mostly socially) contentious issue. Lehning identifies the 1870s
as the approximate time that immigration began to gain negative attention in the social
sphere: "Foreigners were certainly not a focus of attention before the last third of the
century, nor were foreigners rigidly excluded from participation in activities that later
became associated with being a citizen." 63 A large part of this newfound focus on
immigration was due to the extent to which the French economy relied on immigrant
labor: "By the 1880s a new danger appeared: the French economy seemed increasingly
dependent on foreign labor." 64 The French people were concerned that, should there be a
decrease in the availability and accessibility of foreign labor, their economy would suffer.
The potential volatility of the international labor market rendered this concern
understandable. But along with it was a healthy dose of plain and simple xenophobia. For
the first time, the French people felt encroached upon and threatened by the large number
of immigrants living among them. In 1886, lawyer and politician Alexandre Bérard
published a report in which he harshly condemned the "flot étranger" that was "invading"
the country. The majority of the French public shared this anti-immigrant sentiment,
especially when it came to employment. Because the French economy was not doing well
in middle and late 1880s, employment and job security were particular concerns. The
French people resented the fact that they had to compete with foreign workers for the
limited number of available positions: "[The economic crisis] did not mean that foreign
workers already in the country returned home. They instead became a part of the floating
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mass of workers tramping around the country...looking for work." 65 To unemployed
French workers, it was both unfair and nonsensical to fill job openings with foreign labor
rather than "native" labor. And from a performance standpoint, they felt themselves
superior to foreign workers in every way: "French workers saw themselves replaced by
foreigners whose apparent merit came from their obsequiousness. Immigrants drove down
not only the price of labour but also the character of the worker." 66
The integrity of foreign workers was thus called into question, establishing a clear
hierarchy in which the native Frenchman was at the top and the immigrant workers at the
bottom. Slurs and stereotypes that targeted foreigners (particularly Italians and Germans)
became common. A prominent French legislator named A. Pradon chose to refer to
Italians and Germans collectively as the "mob," and maintained that Germans were
"vagrants" and "vagabonds" who selfishly came to France for personal gain. 67 The
number of instances of violence against foreign workers also began to mount, making an
astonishing leap from just five incidents over a span of nine years to seventy-seven
incidents over a span of twelve. 68 Most of these incidents took place in densely populated
urban areas like Marseille, Paris, and the Nord region of France. When they unfolded,
they tended to begin in the workplace. Depending on the nature of the altercation, they
had the potential to escalate into massive public protests: "In these apparently
spontaneous events, the workers who were the initiators of the disturbance were quickly
joined by a wide cross-section of the population, rapidly mobilizing thousands,
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sometimes as many as ten thousand." 69 The fact that what began as mere workplace
disturbances often spiraled so far out of control is a testament to the level of anxiety the
French people felt in the presence of foreigners. The convergence of the public on the
occasion of such an event resulted in what was effectively a demonstration, complete
with flag-waving and the chanting of slogans. Amidst cries of "Vive la France!", the
French people called for the expulsion of foreign workers and the return of their patrie.
Concerns about foreigners were multiplying on the political level as well.
Attitudes that were prevalent a hundred years earlier during the Revolution began to
resurface: foreigners were once again suspected of espionage and perceived as a threat to
national security. The French government chose to assuage these fears by implementing a
series of surveillance measures, all of which were designed to "keep track" of the
comings and goings of immigrants and foreign workers. The most significant of these
measures was an 1888 law that mandated two things: one, that all immigrants possess
"pièces justificatives" by which they could prove their identity; and two, that all
foreigners register with the mairie in their town or city of residence. 70 This law
constituted an unprecedented manifestation of xenophobic paranoia which was all the
more disturbing because it came from the state level. Immigration had been problematic
in the social sphere in the past, but never before had it been so blatantly challenged by
the French government. Lehning explains that the decision to pass what were really very
stringent measures for the time was probably related to the 1871 loss of the FrancoPrussian War: "The foreigners who seemed to be 'invading' France were a threatening
presence in a country that had only fifteen years earlier suffered military invasion and
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defeat." 71 Immigration was thus an unwelcome and unwanted reminder of the events of
the recent war, the first of many international conflicts to remain in France's historic
memory and influence its attitude toward foreigners.
This violent political and social reaction immigrants and foreigners in the late
1880s had very interesting implications for France's own national identity. At the same
time as immigrants and foreigners were criticized and degraded in the public sphere,
French national identity was subtly elevated in the minds of the people. In Lehning's
words, "[The} descriptions of the dangers and threats posed by foreigners also articulated
the positive qualities and contributions of French workers as citizens of the French nation
and the Republic." 72 To degrade foreigners was also, by default, to praise Frenchness.
Tombs chooses a sparser yet equally impactful way of describing this phenomenon: "The
influx of foreign workers...increased a sense of Frenchness as a by-product of
xenophobia." 73 Anti-immigrant sentiment was thus, in a strange sort of way, an
opportunity for the still-new Republic to valorize its own national identity. This is not to
say, of course, that this experimentation with self-identification was innocent. As
Lehning points out, the way in which national symbols and slogans were incorporated
into displays of anti-immigrant sentiment constituted a "French nationalism conflated
with republicanism." 74 But it was nonetheless an exploration of French national identity
such that the Republic had had few occasions for in years prior.
The surveillance law of 1888 also affected the notions of the individual and the
citizen that had been established during the Revolution. Because of the law's insistence
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on foreigners' registration in France, nationality became distinctly important when
considering individual identity: "It was this penetration of state authority which thrust
nationality forward as the most important facet of an individual's identity." 75 During the
Revolution, individual identity was defined by Frenchness. The importance of the
individual in the context of the national whole was that he or she was first and foremost a
French citizen. After the law of 1888, the premise of individual identity remained
fundamentally the same, but with a subtle and extremely important difference: the
relationship of the individual to the national whole could now also be defined by
foreignness. The surveillance law rendered it impossible to think about being a French
citizen without also considering the possibility that one was not a French citizen,
precisely because nationality was constantly being called into question. If one was
French, one belonged to the national whole. If one was foreign, one simply did not.
The kinds of duties involved in being a "true" French citizen also changed. The
surveillance law ultimately had the effect of trickling down: not only was the government
surveilling on a national level, but individual French citizens were also surveilling on an
individual and local level. Lehning provides an excellent explanation of how this local
surveillance operated: "The [law]...established a relationship between the citizens of the
Republic, who would watch the foreigners in their midst, and those foreigners
themselves, who remained marked as separate from the community in which they
lived." 76 This kind of social policing was civically acceptable in that it was approved of
and encouraged by the French government, but it also became a compulsion that allowed
paranoia to run rampant and the stigmatization and stereotyping of foreigners to develop
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freely. By the end of the 19th century, immigration and foreign presence in France was a
full-fledged polemic issue on both social and political fronts.
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III. Le Début du Vingtième Siècle: French Colonial Expansion and
Pre-War Algeria
One of the major factors that shaped the French perception of immigration in the
early 1900s was the country's steady pursuit and acquisition of colonial possessions in
Africa. French imperialism was by no means new to the 20th century: Herbert Luethy
states that France "unquestionably possesses the oldest and greatest colonial tradition of
all European nations." 77 Its culminating point in the early 1900s, however, had huge
implications for both French foreign policy and the French perception of foreignness in
general. It is therefore necessary to understand the ways in which France played into and
internalized the European imperialist project.
Throughout the 1800s, Germany, France, and Britain (and for a time, Belgium)
were actively competing for economic and military supremacy in Western Europe. This
desire for supremacy was closely linked to the acquisition and control of foreign territory,
and in that respect it was nothing new: state power and the expansion of territory had
gone hand-in-hand for ages. The particular brand of European colonialism that developed
as the 1800s drew on, however, was not something that had been seen before on the
world stage. Instead of simply entering foreign countries and claiming them as their own,
the European powers were gleaning distinct economic advantages from their colonial
conquests: "It was colonisation on a mercantilist, almost feudal pattern...large-scale
ownership of land was introduced and trading stations were established." 78 The colonizers
established long-term industrial and trading mechanisms abroad in the interest of
extracting the country's raw materials and shipping them back home for domestic use. It
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was exploitation in its purest form, and in terms of power dynamics, it was enormously
effective: bereft of resources and any sort of legal or social power, the colonized peoples
could do little to combat the European presence.
The effectiveness of the exploitative system in meeting European expectations is
evidenced by what is now known as the "Scramble for Africa." The resource rich,
minimally explored, and (soi-disant) uncivilized continent of Africa was the perfect
tableau for colorful European colonial dreams--especially when diamonds were
discovered in Africa's interior. In 1884 and 1885, the European powers held the Berlin
Conference on Africa, where delegates heatedly discussed the "fairest" way to proceed
with claiming territory in Africa. In reality, the conference was little more than an excuse
for the European powers to hash out "who gets what": by the time the conference was
over, the map of Africa they had been using as a guide was completely marked up. All
unclaimed territory had been divvied up among nine very eager European countries, all of
which wasted no time claiming the countries allotted to them. In 1880, European powers
controlled ten percent of the continent, but by the year 1900 only two African countries
remained free of colonial rule. 79
France's share of African territory was significant: by 1898, France had conquered
nearly all of Western Africa and part of Central Africa as well. 80 The acquisition of such
a vast expanse of territory in such a short time was met with a variety of reactions from
the French people. Many did not view the colonial endeavor favorably because it did not
correspond with the core values upon which the Republic had been founded: it went
entirely against the principles of liberté, égalité, and fraternité that the French people
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held so dear. The majority of the dissenters' doubts were, however, quick to fade. As time
passed, it became clear that colonialism could be incredibly useful, both for the economic
advantage it secured France over the rest of Europe and the prestige it entailed. They thus
gradually became reconciled to the idea: "Republicans...convinced themselves that
associating the colonies closely with France would ensure that colonial peoples would
share the advantages of modern French political life to their mutual benefit." 81
As far as justifications for colonialism went, this was a common one. Just as
Napoleon had done some two hundred years ago, the European colonial powers justified
their conquests in Africa and elsewhere in the name of the "civilizing mission": the
colonizer moves in, sets up camp, and is gracious enough to share its bounty of European
knowledge and values with the primitive native societies. Such a rationale implied that
both societies benefit equally from colonialism: the colonized are enlightened by the
"superior" European culture and the colonizer's empire expands. This message is
delivered loud and clear within the following statement, uttered by 19th century writer
and politician Prévost-Paradol: "Africa...should not be for us simply a trading post...it is
a French land which as soon as possible should be peopled, possessed, and cultivated by
Frenchmen." 82 This vision, in which both societies mutually benefit from the colonial
presence, was the official narrative at the time, adopted by European governments and
disseminated to a wide and very receptive public.
The reality of what was going on in colonized areas was, of course, much less
idyllic. Contrary to what the European press was printing back home, native peoples were
routinely and systematically massacred by colonial regimes. Military activity was poorly
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regulated, giving the soldiers and other personnel living abroad free reign to do as they
wished. And when word of questionable goings-on abroad did trickle back to Europe,
officials usually had little to say: "Parliament made no protest; it did not object to...[for
example] the methods of the high officials of the Moroccan protectorate, who provoked
riots and unrest on their own initiative in order to get rid of an inconvenient sultan." 83
Additionally, stringent and discriminatory laws established by the colonizers left the
native people with little to no rights as to their own fate or the fate of their country. Most
were deprived of the right to vote, and for those who were granted a voice were usually
attributed votes that had lesser weight than the votes of the Europeans. This kind of
oppression was what gave colonialism a bad name--a period of history that truly "ought
not to have existed." 84
The harsh reality of colonialism was a sharp and direct contrast to the naive
optimism and excitement with which many Europeans regarded the colonial project in
Africa. As far as France is concerned, no country serves as a better model for examining
both "sides" of colonialism than Algeria. The French tie with Algeria is one of its oldest
colonial relationships, and it is quite possibly the single most influential foreign
relationship in all of France's history. Because of the intensity with which France linked
itself to Algeria and because of the subsequent violence which tore apart both countries,
the Franco-Algerian relationship has had a profound impact on notions of French national
identity and self-hood. Though nearly half a century has passed since decolonization, the
reverberations of France's ties with Algeria can still be felt in modern-day France,
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strongly affecting French attitudes toward immigrants, foreigners, and their own national
identity.
France's relationship with Algeria began long before the colonial fervor in Europe
was in full swing. In May of 1830, a fleet of ships carrying French militiamen took the
land by storm: "On May 16,1830, a fleet of five hundred French ships headed from
Toulon to Algiers...on July 5,1830, the dey85 of Algiers signed the act of surrender. The
French colonial conquest had begun." 86 From this date forward, Algeria was a French
colonial possession--that much was definitive. What was still unclear was how the
military would choose to proceed: "After the surrender of the Algiers authorities, the
French military held effective power, but was divided on what course to follow. Should
there be limited or total occupation?" 87 The high level of resistance that the French army
encountered complicated the question. Several religious sects in Algeria declared holy
war on the French, spurring a series of bloody clashes that continued for the next forty
years.
It was not until 1871 that the French army was able to effectively put a stop to the
rebellion and begin withdrawing troops from the country. When they left, they transferred
the political power to thousands of European settlers (known as colons) who lived there.
Drawn by (among other things) the lower cost of living and the promise of farmable land,
Europeans flocked to Algeria--French, Spanish, Italian, and Maltese alike.

88

By 1870,

85

Roughly, "governor"
Stora, Benjamin. Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History. 3
87
Stora, 4
88
Stora, 8-9

86

44

there were upwards of 250,000 colons living in Algeria, 89 and by 1896 the number of
Europeans born on Algerian soil surpassed the number of immigrants themselves. 90
The ensemble of these Europeans living in Algeria came to be referred to as pieds
noirs, 91 and the mere fact of their presence made the Franco-Algerian relationship
markedly unique. Not once on any of its other colonial territories had France established
a colonie de peuplement, or settlement colony, the way it did in Algeria. Bona fide
French citizens lived, worked, and built lives and families there, creating stronger and
more "intimate" ties between the two countries than France had ever had before. As
Luethy claimed, "[Algiers is] as much a French city as Marseilles or Bordeaux, not the
capital of a colony, but of a department of France." 92 Stora uses similar language,
referring to Algeria as "a continuation of France on the other side of the
Mediterranean." 93 Most famously of all, François Mittérand (who held the post of Prime
Minister in France at the time) publicly announced that "l'Algérie, c'est la France."
Such statements are demonstrative of the mixture of idealism and myopia that
characterized political discourse about the French/Algerian relationship at the time. If
Algeria truly had been France, or even a trans-Mediterranean extension of France, the
Algerians would not have suffered the type of injustices that were continuously imposed
upon them from the very beginning of French occupation. Despite what politicians like
Mittérand were saying, it had never been their intention to extend equal rights to the
Algerian natives: "[France's] aim was to ensure the absolute and complete subjugation of
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the population to the needs and interests of colonization. The colons enjoyed full rights;
the colonized were 'subjects' not 'citizens.'" 94
The ruthlessness with which the French authorities oppressed the Muslim
populations of Algeria is perhaps most evident in the context of housing and land. Ever
since the inception of the colony in 1830, the French had no qualms about taking land
from the Algerian people. They took what land they needed for their own enterprises by
force, regardless of whether or not the land was designated holy or religious land by the
natives. On the basis of their soi-disant cultural and racial superiority, they felt entitled to
it. In time, this attitude generated some extremely alarming statistics: "Between 1871 and
1919, 215 million acres were handed over to the colons...by 1919, the Muslims had lost
18.5 million acres, which the state, individuals, and major companies had divided up
amongst themselves." 95
This loss of land was devastating for the native people, and it occurred on such a
massive scale that it changed the entire layout of Algerian cities: "In the city of Algiers
alone, excluding its outskirts, 120 slums, like a cancer growing on all available land, had
some 80,000 Muslims crowded together in unbelievable living conditions." Astoundingly,
the Casbah 96 sustained even worse levels of overcrowding than the slums: "The
Casbah...crammed 70,000 residents into its 50 acres, breaking world records in human
density." 97 As if being made to live in unimaginable conditions were not enough, the
Muslim Algerians were also subject to a series of repressive measures that were solidified
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by the Code de l'Indigénat (Native Code). The Code, which came into effect in 1881,
included "an internal passport system, forced labor, and penalties for acts or remarks
prejudicial to French sovereignty." 98 Because the natives were at this point completely
disenfranchised, they were powerless to combat the Code that was imposed upon them.
The treatment of the native Algerians following World Wars I and II is also an
injustice that must not be overlooked. During World War I, large numbers of indigenous
Algerians and pieds noirs alike fought in Europe for the French cause. Their reasons for
doing so were varied: some, feeling a genuine allegiance to the French nation,
volunteered. Some agreed to fight in hopes that their service would lead to
enfranchisement and social advancement. Many, doubtless, were forced into conscription.
Whatever their reason, most met the same tragic ending. A staggering total of
approximately 22,000 pieds noirs and 25,000 Muslim soldiers lost their lives to the war. 99
This was obviously devastating on both a personal and a national level. But for a
number of slightly less obvious reasons, it was especially devastating for the native
Algerian veterans who survived the war. The deployment had provided them with the
opportunity to see Western society firsthand. For many, it was their first time seeing (let
alone inhabiting) the France that had been so present in their lives, so--despite the
context in which it took place--their experience in Europe left quite an impression.
Seeing Frenchmen on their own soil, witnessing a much higher standard of living, and
experiencing life free of the Native Code was, for the native Algerians especially, an eyeopening experience. If they were granted the same rights as the colons, this is what life
could be like every day and all of the time. Returning to Algeria's Native Code was thus
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extremely difficult: "Dissatisfaction was the very logical result of the gap between the
possibilities they had glimpsed in France and the wretchedness of what was now their
daily fate." 100 After getting a taste of freedom, it was virtually impossible to go back to
the way things were. In this way, World War I triggered an important shift in Algerian
attitudes toward the French occupation: the seeds of major unrest had been sewn.
The interwar period was characterized both by immigration and emigration:
thousands more Europeans poured into Algeria, and significant numbers of both pieds
noirs and native Algerians chose to immigrate to France. The latter group was motivated
largely by economic reasons. A growing population made for a dwindling number of jobs
in Algeria, 101 and reconstruction efforts after the war opened up plenty of employment
opportunities in France. France itself had suffered an enormous number of casualties in
the war (1,322,000 dead and another 3 million wounded), 102 and this fact combined with
historically low French birth rates made the need for foreign labor virtually inexhaustible.
To ensure that labor needs were met, France implemented an economic immigration
program for the first time, whereby the government could control the flow of incoming
workers as it saw fit: "In contrast with the pre-war situation, where immigrant labor was
largely unregulated, the State itself took charge of organizing the supply of foreign
workers." 103 This kind of formal recruitment provided Algerian and other North African
residents with official channels to go through if they wished to immigrate to France. It
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was through this mechanism that France became "the world's [single] largest importer of
people." 104
In spite of this claim, French attitudes vis-à-vis the unprecedented number of new
arrivals in their country were usually blatantly hostile. The French overlooked the fact
that these immigrants were doing them a service by helping to rebuild their country,
giving way instead to resentment and deeply-rooted prejudice: "However much they may
have benefited from being released from the dirtiest and most menial jobs, [French native
workers] strongly resented the presence of foreigners in their midst and rarely extended a
hand of welcome or friendship." 105 Racist discourse contributed greatly to French
hostility toward immigrants, often targeting Algeria's Arab population. According to late
19th century anthropologist Gustave Le Bon, "the intellectual and moral character of a
race was the basis for classification," and in this regard "the Arab population of Algeria
was distinctly lacking." Le Bon also stated that the indigenous Algerians were nothing
more than "[the] degenerate products of all the conquerors who had ruled them." 106 In
view of all that the Algerian and other African immigrants had done for France, the
barbarous treatment they received was a moral outrage.
Back in Algeria, the restrictions of the Native Code continued to weigh heavily
upon the Muslim Algerians. Disillusioned by the events of World War I, the majority
firmly opposed the French presence in their country. Unrest was steadily growing,
becoming more and more distinguishable from the "veiled, latent form" 107 it had assumed
in the past. There was a small glimmer of hope for the native population in 1936 when
104

Tombs, 324
McMillan, 80
106
Lehning, 135
107
Stora, 11
105

49

the French government proposed the Blum-Viollette Plan. In short, the Plan would "grant
political equality to a small proportion of the Algerian population, gradually extending it
to the majority. Without abandoning Muslim status, a minority would thus have obtained
the same political rights as French citizens." 108 The Plan was everything the native
Algerians had ever wanted from the French.
The Plan did not, however, come to fruition: the discussion surrounding its
passage was so heated and so lengthy that "an attitude of distrust, then of hostility,
developed" 109 between Algerian nationalist groups and the French government. The
tension eventually became so acute that any possibility of the Plan going into effect
disappeared. This affair transformed the social climate in Algeria entirely. By proposing
the Plan and failing to implement it, the French government had effectively dangled the
carrot of equal rights in front of the noses of the colonized only to snatch it away.
Indigenous Algerians were furious: French-Algerian relations were becoming
dangerously heated. Already, it looked as if a peace between the two nations was
unsalvageable.
If it were possible, the beginning of World War II in 1939 strained FrancoAlgerian relations even more. Again huge numbers of indigenous Algerians and pieds
noirs fought on behalf of France, and again huge numbers lost their lives: in terms of
military service, the situation remained the same. The situation also remained the same
with regard to the overall lack of recognition that the native Algerian veterans received
from the French government. De Gaulle did extend French citizenship to a limited
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number of veterans and other Algerian Muslims in 1943 110, but the majority received
nothing more than accolades for their service: "As recompense, France had merely given
them medals, war pendants, and government jobs. Many who had hoped to obtain French
citizenship or at least equal rights with French Algerians were dismayed by this
ingratitude." 111
The lack of adequate recognition by the French government was like a slap in the
face, and one they refused to endure any longer. The unrest came to a boiling point at the
same time the war ended: "On May 8, 1945, the day the armistice was signed, Muslim
Algerians paraded in most of the cities of Algeria, with banners bearing the slogan 'Down
with fascism and colonialism.'" 112 What had previously been mere demonstrations turned
into full-on violent riots. Muslim Algerians were demanding change loudly, and
miraculously--for the first time since 1830--the French government listened. As part of its
decolonization effort, the government passed a bill in 1946 stating "All subjects of
overseas territories, including Algeria, possess the quality of citizens with the same rights
as French citizens in the home country and in the overseas territories." 113 In the context of
the nearly nonexistent rights of the past, this was quite a boon. And perhaps if it had been
offered earlier, the native Algerians would have accepted it gladly. But as it were, it was
simply too late: henceforth, it would be independence or nothing.

110

Stora, 21
Gilles Martin, 52
112
Stora, 21
113
Luethy, 220
111

51

IV. La Guerre Sans Nom: The Franco-Algerian War, 1954-1962
The Franco-Algerian War officially began on November 1st, 1954, 114 but the
violent attacks that would come to be characteristic of the war as a whole began long
before. Algerian nationalists were the first to act, targeting pieds noirs, French, and other
Europeans as early as 1950: "The rebellion broke out in Aurès, one of the most destitute
regions in Algeria. Its beginnings were marked by subversive acts and the massacre of
Europeans." These acts were accompanied by a swift and rallying call to action: "On
November 1, 1950, the leaders of the rebellion issued an appeal to the Algerian people to
combat colonialism." 115 Algerian Muslims answered the call enthusiastically, responding
to the nationalistic climate that was sweeping the country.
By 1954, what were in previous years several disparate rebel groups had
consolidated into one centralized group called the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).
The group, described by Stora as "the sole heir to Algerian nationalism," 116 was extremist
from the get-go. Its leaders used a combination of "propaganda and coercion" 117 to gain
support and incite nationalism among Muslim Algerians, who rallied behind the group
swiftly and enthusiastically. In the beginning, the FLN seemed to them to be the
embodiment of everything they had been pursuing: it demanded independence for
Algeria, and it demanded it loudly. It combined a nationalistic ideal with a heavy-handed
approach, two components that would be necessary in dealing with the French colonial
giant. But the people were largely unprepared for the enormous breadth and scope of the
violence that was to be unleashed on the French armies two years later.
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In the interim between the FLN's inception in 1954 and its first violent attacks in
1956, 118 the French government occupied itself with internal negotiations for which there
was seemingly no end. What to do about the rebellion in Algeria? The government was
sharply divided on the issue: "The prolongation of the war led to a debate in metropolitan
France on the status of Algeria. The alternatives were integration, independence, or
partition--each entailing radical changes." 119 Each of the three courses of action
represented a commitment that France was, as of yet, unwilling to make. The only thing
government officials did agree on was that withdrawing from Algeria point-blank was out
of the question. The two countries had simply been tied too closely for too long. After all,
l'Algérie, c'était la France: Governor general Jacques Soustelle proclaimed that "France
would no more leave Algeria than she would leave Provence or Brittany." 120
Soustelle's statement places France's decision to stay in Algeria in a very moral
framework, implying that France was so dedicated the Algerian cause that it would stick
by the people even in times of hardship. This was decidedly not the case: France acted
the way it did out of pure self-interest. Having an authoritarian and military presence in
Algeria had been economically and strategically advantageous to France for decades, and
the government was not interested in losing these advantages. There is the additional
possibility that part of the reason why France was so invested in Algeria was due to the
natural gas and oil reserves discovered in the Sahara in 1952: "The sizable investments in
the Sahara were mentioned by some Frenchmen as a...reason for continuing the war." 121
Stora chimes in on this topic as well and even goes a step further, suggesting that the
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expansive space of the Sahara gave the French a perfect place to test their nuclear
weapons: "In the course of the war itself, the discovery of oil and the decision to use the
vast Sahara for the first nuclear space experiments came to be added to...[the]
rationale." 122 It is unclear whether or not these factors played into the French
government's thinking about Algeria, but the fact that prominent historians are suggesting
it is significant: France was acting not out of humanitarian or fraternal loyalty to the
Algerian people, but based on its own self-motivated interests.
For the time being, however, France's approach to the crisis in Algeria remained
shaky. Clinging to the idea that reconciliation under their terms was still possible, the
French government decided to pursue a policy of pacification: in 1955, "peacekeeping"
troops were poured into Algeria by the thousands. This action was met with violent
protest on the part of the French soldiers, many of whom had already spent years in
Algeria with the French military and had since been recalled home: "On September 1, at
the Gare de l'Est in Paris, two thousand young people refused to board trains, shouting
'Civilian life!' 'No war in Algeria!'" 123 These manifestations were indicative not only of
the soldiers' anger and anxiety at being redeployed, but also of the presence of a general
public opposition to the war as a whole.
The heightened French military presence had even more disastrous consequences
on Algerian soil. The soldiers were increasingly repressive of the Algerian natives,
behaving in brutally discriminatory ways on a regular basis. Wherever they went, they
spread violence and destroyed Algerian villages. 124 Any individual rights that had
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previously been extended to Algerians were officially revoked, prompting large numbers
of young Algerians to join with the FLN: "The repression pushed thousands of young
Algerians toward the guerrilla forces (students in particular, who organized a strike in
1956)." 125 In February of the same year, the FLN decided it would abide the influx of
troops and the repression of Algeria no longer: the first organized attacks on French
soldiers, police forces, and pieds noirs took place in the city of Oran. On the French side,
this meant complete and total chaos: for want of adequate training, the troops were fatally
taken by surprise. 126
After the initial strike, one thing became clear: if the French were to successfully
maintain their stake in Algeria, they would need to up the ante. So it did just that: in
response to the violence in Oran, the French government pumped still more troops into
the heart of Algeria. "The extremist pieds noirs and the army demanded an increase in the
number of soldiers, already 190,000 strong in February 1956." 127 Accompanying this new
wave of soldiers was a fleet of helicopters, sent to support the French military's newest
and most drastic endeavor to date: the partitioning of the capital city of Algiers. They
divided it cleanly into three "zones," each one designated for a different military
operation and strategy: "In the zone of operation, the objective would be to 'crush the
rebels.' In the pacification zones, the 'protection' of European and Muslim populations
was foreseen...forbidden zones were to be evacuated, and the population assembled in
'settlement camps' and placed under control of the army." 128
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This was the first major manifestation of French military strategy on the ground in
Algeria, and it was significant for several reasons. For one, it represented somewhat of a
turning point in France's foreign policy in Algeria. Since the onset of the war, French
government officials had been indecisive as to how to deal with the hostile rebel groups
and the emerging FLN. Faced with a series of choices that were equally unappealing, the
French had government pursued no definitive course of action beyond further
"assimilation" of the Algerian people: "The attitude of the authorities in Algeria was that
of a series of refusals amounting to a total denial of reality. The truth was unbearable
because it was tragic. A choice had to be made between prolonging the war and granting
independence." 129 The partitioning of the city of Algiers made it clear which choice
France had made. The French government had unequivocally refused to withdraw from
the country, and the war would continue to wreak havoc on two continents for another six
long years.
The partitioning of Algiers also had the effect of geographically refocusing both
French military efforts and FLN-led attacks. For the remainder of the war, the majority of
the violence was concentrated in the capital city: "The city became a permanent stage for
latent violence, justified by social exploitation, combined with national oppression, and
which manifested itself...in sudden outbreaks of open conflict." 130 In January of 1957, the
worst outbreak of "open conflict" yet was occurred at the hands of the FLN. A small
group of FLN party members clandestinely planted bombs in two centrally located,
popular bars in the heart of Algiers: "The horror reached its peak on January 26. Within a
few minutes of each other, two charges exploded, the first in the bar L'Otomatic, the
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second in the café Le Coq Hardi, in the very center of Algiers." 131 Both the civilian death
toll and the extent of the damage were unprecedented. The tragedy was absolute: the
attacks (which feature prominently in Gillo Pontecorvo's 1966 film "La Bataille d'Alger")
are demonstrative of the kind of violence and terrorism that the FLN engaged in on a
regular basis. January 26th, 1957 would go down in history as one of the single most
devastating dates of the Franco-Algerian War.
In the context of a discussion of FLN-perpetrated violence, it is of the utmost
importance to emphasize that its severity and magnitude were entirely reciprocated by the
French military forces. The chaos and turmoil in Algiers and elsewhere in the country
provided soldiers and military officials with the opportunity to engage in unspeakable
acts of violence, including the random physical harming and/or murder of Algerian
civilians. Political assassinations were particularly prominent, and civilian deaths
factored highly into these casualties: "[French military forces] arrested one hundred
suspects and shot them on the spot. By the end of the week, well over a thousand
Algerians, mostly civilians, lay dead, marking what Frantz Fanon later called 'the point of
no return.'" 132 Algerian women were targeted as well, enduring intense physical and
emotional abuse: "The history that emerges in [these women's] texts confirms the
physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon Algerian women combatants by the
French military during the anti-colonial struggle." 133 The trauma of this type of abuse still
persists today, weighing heavily on the lives of the women that it impacts.
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The most shocking violence that occurred at the hands of the French, however,
was yet to be fully discovered by the international community: the French military was
torturing its Algerian political prisoners. Drawing on methods of torture that had been
employed by the Nazis during World War II, the French government used a wide variety
of inhumane, atrocious, and shameful tactics to extract information from those it held
captive. Most often, the military was seeking information concerning the identities and
whereabouts of FLN party leaders. The FLN's infrastructure was purposefully and
carefully obscured from the French, so information about who was giving orders and
where to find them was extremely valuable. So valuable, apparently, that the French
military was willing to subject its prisoners to physical, psychological, and sexual torture
until they got it.
This was not limited to a few, isolated incidents, but occurred continuously and on
a regular basis: it was a fundamental part of French "military strategy" in Algeria.
General Jacques Massu "conceded...that torture had systematically been carried out by
the soldiers under his command, particularly during the 'Battle of Algiers.'" 134 Massu was
one individual who later expressed regret about his involvement in torture. In an
interview with prominent French newspaper Le Monde, he stated that "Torture...isn't
indispensable in times of war, and one can very well do without it. When I look back on
Algeria, it saddens me...one could have done things differently." 135 Not everyone who
was implicated in torture, however, attempted to repent for it later. Paul Aussaresses, a
French officer who himself had ordered and carried out torture, did just the opposite: "In
a shameful book, Paul Aussaresses, who held the rank of major at the time, had the
134
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audacity to take credit for, and actually revel in, his crimes." 136 Aussaresses's comments
(made public through the release of his memoirs) were met with moral outrage in France.
How could it possibly be that the great République had engaged in such horrible,
inhuman acts? If the government knew about it, why did they not put a stop to it?
This last question is especially apt, because the French government did in fact
know about the torture that was going on in Algeria. As early as three years before the
War even started, journalist Claude Bourdet wrote an article on the subject for
L'Observateur that questioned the ethics of French interrogation practices in Algeria. In
1955 he wrote a second article, which was expository in nature and which cited specific
names of people who had been tortured. 137 In 1960, Henri Alleg published a book that
provided a first person account of his own torture in Algeria. The book, entitled La
Question, "sold 60,000 copies in one day" and was subsequently "banned by the French
police." 138 Given the presence of these published and widely read accounts and
allegations of torture, it is impossible that the French government did not know what was
going on. But it continued to adamantly deny its involvement in torture for decades after
the War's end.
It bears mentioning that there were a select few members of the French military
forces who openly objected to the use of torture in Algeria. General Paris Bollardière is
the most well-known of these men: "General Paris Bollardière resigned from his post in
1957 on the grounds that the torturing of Algerian citizens contradicted everything he had
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fought against during WWII. He was subsequently reprimanded and thrown in prison." 139
This example is both heartening and disheartening. On one hand, it proves that not all
French soldiers were in favor of or indifferent to the use of torture in military practice:
"Some of the torturers were sadists, to be sure. But many officers, noncommissioned
officers, and soldiers would live with that nightmare for the rest of their lives." 140
Bollardière, who had the courage to stand up to something as immoral and inhumane as
torture, should be commended. But the fact remains that the vast majority of the French
military and the French government remained compliant, creating a deep scar that would
send the entire country reeling for years to come.
What complicates the matter further is that the FLN, too, was involved in torture.
It too contains party members who both ordered and participated in the torture of French
and pied noir prisoners, and these individuals have had to go through their own process
of coming to terms with what they did during the War. Did the FLN torture on the same
level and with the same frequency that the French forces did? Probably not. And it is true
that the FLN never would have come into existence if it were not for the decades of
repression and marginalization that the French colonial power inflicted on Algeria's
native population: "The FLN owed its birth, and much of its appeal, to a history of
violent conquest, racial inequality, and colonial arrogance, during which the French
brutally repressed any stirring of indigenous nationalism." 141 Despite these facts,
however, the torture and the terrorism that the FLN perpetuated remain unjustifiable. The
practice of torture during the Franco-Algerian War remains a stain on both France and
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Algeria. It is an intense and collective trauma that both countries are very much still
grappling with today.
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V. Dans l'Ombre de Ses Crimes: The Challenges of the North African Immigrant in
Postcolonial France, 1962-2000
In the wake of the Franco-Algerian War, France settled into a deep silence. The
atrocities that had been committed were just too horrible to face while the wounds were
still raw. Victims of torture and perpetrators of torture simply tucked their experiences
away, burying the trauma of what they had lived deep within the vaults of a collective
cultural memory. It would be an astonishing thirty-seven years before the French
parliament even acknowledged that there had been a war in Algeria. When they had to
refer to the war at all, they used epithets: "After the French defeat, the Algerian war was
referred to as 'the war without a name' [la guerre sans nom], or, even more obliquely, as
'the events' ['les évenements]." 142 The act of overtly naming the Franco-Algerian War
would have allowed it to take on a power and an immediacy that French society was not
ready to cope with.
This unspoken trauma had strong, far-reaching impacts for those immigrating to
France in the late 1900s. Immediately following the war, there was an influx of migration
(both refugees and voluntary migrants) from Algeria itself. A mixture of native Algerian
refugees, pieds noirs, and harkis 143 arrived on French soil: "In a matter of weeks, a
million forlorn refugees (two percent of the French population in 1962) arrived in
southern France." 144 As Gilles Martin points out, the number of refugees was astounding,
accounting for a full two percent of the entire French population at the time. Because of
the sheer number of Algerian migrants, it was impossible for the French people to simply
142
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ignore them: they were there, in French communities, looking to rebuild their war-torn
lives and start anew. Some kind of assimilation was clearly necessary. But this was much
easier said than done. How could the French people, shocked into silence by the events of
the war, arrive at a place where assimilation would be at all possible? And how could the
pieds noirs and other Algerian migrants, who had been "driven from the only home that
most of them had ever known," manage to surmount the "acute sense of betrayal" 145 that
they felt so deeply?
The difficulty of assimilating inhabitants of former French colonies had been
predicted long before these migrants began to arrive in France. Gustave LeBon spoke of
the impossibility of assimilating indigenous populations as early as the 1870s: "'Two
races so dissimilar,' he wrote, 'could never live in peace on the same soil.'" 146 19th
century racial hierarchy theories placed the indigenous people of colonized countries far
below the "purebred" white, Christian Europeans, creating a perception of French
superiority that never seemed to dispel: "Racial stereotypes in which these differences
were often expressed found an unusual virulence when used to describe colonial
subjects." 147 As such, Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Malian immigrants (among
others) were confronted with racism and discrimination in France on a regular basis.
Hampered by stereotypes that held that Arab Muslims were lazy, incompetent, and
degenerate, it was often difficult for them to find jobs or pursue an education:
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"Immigrants and their children tended to be excluded from the usual French route to
social advancement." 148
The way that housing was set up by the State also contributed heavily to the social
exclusion that immigrants faced. The end of World War II in 1945 and the end of the
Franco-Algerian War in 1962 gave way to large numbers of migrants who wished to
come live and work in France, which was problematic for one important reason: there
were not enough accommodations available for them. The need for more low-income
housing quickly became apparent, and the government set about constructing hostels and
low-income apartments (widely known today as HLM 149): "In the 1950s [and 1960s] the
state built hostels and low-rent apartments for single workers near factories and away
from city centers, a decision that was intended to...tightly link immigration to specific
labor needs." 150 The idea behind this housing design was that single male workers who
immigrated to France for labor purposes would be able to afford a room or an apartment
while still maintaining proximity to the workplace.
For a while, this system functioned reasonably well. Single male workers lived
either in hostels (designated "immigrant housing") or in small HLM apartments located
near their place of employment. Some of these migrants stayed in France for long periods
of time, while others came, completed work, and then promptly returned to their home
countries. But by the 1960s, the mentality of migrant workers was changing. Drawn to
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what was, for most migrants, a more developed society and an overall higher standard of
living, they decided to stay in France permanently. Many foreign laborers also had
families that they aspired to bring to over in the future using a family reunification visa.
Living in France afforded migrant families economic opportunities that were not
available in their home countries, and parents wanted to provide their children with the
best life that they could give.
One byproduct of this decision to settle in France permanently was that the
housing the government had built (and continued to build throughout the late 1900s) was
insufficient in a variety of ways. For one, the HLM apartments were extremely cramped.
They had been constructed with the occupancy of one single male worker in mind, so
fitting entire families into an apartment was quite a feat. They were also extremely
inconveniently located: "Following the modernist style of the day, projects were built as
separated islands of 500 or more apartments, often far from public transportation." 151
HLM apartments were usually built on the outskirts of major cities (Paris, Lyon,
Marseille, and in the Alsace and Mosel regions 152), and as such were isolated from the
heart of urban social life.
This physical isolation is a manifestation of the kind of social exclusion that North
African immigrants faced (and continue to face) in France. Most could not afford their
own vehicle, so without easy access to public transportation, migrants had no way of
accessing the cultural resources available to them in more central parts of the city. Their
geographic isolation also effectively limited or prevented them from forming any kind of
social network outside of their immediate environments (workplace and the HLM
151
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apartment complex), creating conditions that gave rise to widespread loneliness and
depression. Most migrants maintained close ties with relatives and friends in their
countries of origin as a way of combating these feelings, making frequent phone calls and
sending mail. Those who could afford it made periodic visits back to their home
countries, returning to France out of financial necessity of because their visas or
residence permits stipulated that they had to.
By the 1980s, the first generation of North African migrants had given way to a
second generation. Born on French soil to immigrant parents, 153 these "second
generation" children faced a whole slew of social, economic, and personal difficulties. As
author and professor Mireille Rosello points out, the challenges that this second
generation faced--and also the advantages they possessed--were distinct from those of
their parents: "By the 1980s, the single male migrant worker of the 1950s and 1960s had
been replaced by a whole generation...whose relationship to France, to French culture,
and to French laws needed to be rearticulated." 154 Unlike their parents, this second
generation possessed legal French citizenship. They were born in France, raised in
France, and educated in French schools. They spoke the language fluently whereas their
parents, in many cases, did not. Based on these facts alone, it would seem that the second
generation had an easier time functioning and achieving upward mobility in French
society than did their parents.
This, however, was quite decidedly not the case. While a command of the French
language and a more thorough knowledge of French society and culture were both
153
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significant advantages for the second generation, they encountered an entirely new set of
biases and challenges that were specific to their time period. Unemployment was one of
these challenges. Generally speaking, the waves of chômage in France were a structural
problem that affected everyone. It had been nearly thirty full years since the end of World
War II, so the country was no longer in need of a body of foreign labor to help with
rebuilding efforts. Women were also getting more involved in the workplace, and the
postwar baby-boom generation was coming of age right around the 1980s. 155 All of these
circumstances paved the way for high rates of unemployment for second-generation
children of immigrant parents.
This structural explanation is all well and good, and it is certainly not inaccurate.
But the heart of the problem, and the reason why unemployment hit children North
African immigrants harder than any other population, was unadulterated discrimination
and racial profiling. Employers made pre-judgments about non-white job candidates on a
regular basis, automatically shifting (whether literally or figuratively) the applications of
persons of color to the bottom of the pile. Non-whiteness was associated with nonFrenchness, and the quality of being native French (français de souche) was a quality
that was increasingly valued above all others. This applied not only to the workplace, but
to the larger French social environment as well. Skin color was constantly being used as a
barometer for character, placing non-white children of immigrants at a continuous social
disadvantage and barring them from a variety of different kinds of success from a very
young age. If one was not white and born in France of native French parents, one was
almost certain to be pre-judged and misconstrued.
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Second-generation children of immigrants also had to grapple with what were
often conflicting expectations and desires from their parents' end. Being first-generation
immigrants themselves, parents had various degrees of immersion in French society.
Some (mainly those whose country of origin was a former French colony) spoke French
fluently and held decently paying jobs. They maintained a high degree of contact with
society and were thus up to date on contemporary trends, mores, and social knowhow.
The children of these immigrant parents belonged to more privileged milieus and usually
encountered very little cultural identity-related conflict at home. This group of parents,
however, was a very small minority, and was not at all representative of most firstgeneration immigrants' situations. The majority spoke imperfect or broken French, and
many were functionally or completely illiterate (analphabètes). They held menial jobs
(housecleaning, janitorial work, etc.) that paid meager wages, lived in deplorable
conditions, and generally struggled to get by on a day-to-day basis.
It is the children of this group of first-generation immigrants who faced--and who
continue to face--a set of profound familial tensions at home. France has, in many senses
of the word, been extremely cruel to the parents, breeding an acute sense of resentment
that leads them to reject involvement with the greater French society. Quite
understandably, they cling to cultural customs from their countries of origin, passing on
their native language, values, and practices to their children. Today, this results in a sort
of juggling act for the second-generation child: at home, he or she speaks a language that
is not French and speaks and acts according to the customs of the parents' native culture.
In public life, on the other hand--at school, with friends, in stores and public venues--he
or she is a fully functioning French citizen. This involvement in what are essentially two
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entirely different worlds has some very real implications for the child's own sense of
cultural and personal identity. In one sense, both of these identities belong to the child.
He or she is technically French, but grew up speaking a language that was not French,
and observed different cultural customs in the domestic space. This renders the parents'
native culture an equally fundamental part of his or her identity.
In another, opposite (yet equally true) sense, the children of immigrant parents feel
that they can lay claim to neither of these two identities. They feel themselves to be
caught between two cultures, and are never able to fully identify a hundred percent with
one or the other: "The children of North African immigrants are often held responsible
for the success or failure of cultural exchange or cohabitation: they are seen as mediators,
as go-betweens, whose seemingly natural function is to occupy the no man's land between
the perpetual host and the eternal guest." 156 Because of this sense of "stuckness," it is not
uncommon for second-generation children feel an intense sense of resentment towards
France that is akin to the resentment their parents feel. They are perceived as second-rate
citizens and afforded fewer rights and opportunities than their peers who are born of
native French parents.
Mehdi Charef's 157 1983 novel Le Thé au Harem (Tea in the Harem) treats this
sense of resentment, anger, and frustration extensively, taking as its protagonist a secondgeneration child of immigrant parents named Majid. The book jacket reads as follows: "A
housing estate in the Paris suburbs. Majid is growing up caught between two cultures. At
home; he listens to his mother's constant invective in Arabic as she attempts to make
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sense of her new surroundings; at school he tries to be part of French culture, a culture
that rejects and insults Arabs." 158 Charef's novel and the publication of others like it in
the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as a mechanism for challenging the social injustices that
immigrants in France are facing. He is spreading awareness while at the same time
offering commentary on a situation of which he himself has firsthand knowledge,
constituting an important contribution to French cultural consciousness. Novels like Le
Thé au Harem matter a lot, precisely because they represent a voice that is seldom heard
in French society.
Literature also provides a space for exploring multiple facets of personal and
cultural identity that France does not allow for in the public sphere.
The abstract, universalist notion of French national identity leaves very little wiggle room
for identification with multiple cultures, which is intensely problematic for immigrants
and children of immigrants. French Republican principles insist that the notion of the
homogeneous, abstract French "citizen" is the basis for equality. But the needs of secondgeneration children of immigrants mandate a more concrete, more holistic interpretation
of identity: "The defenders of the abstract mode argue that it alone guarantees universal
equality; the defenders of the concrete mode do not reject universalism but think equality
is achieved by addressing rather than ignoring social distinctions." 159 This tension
between the abstract and concrete modes of representation is at the very heart of the
experience of immigrant populations in France. How is it finally possible to call oneself a
citizen of a country whose notion of citizenship excludes fundamental and defining
aspects of one's personal identity?
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These kinds of questions about immigration, representation, and French national
identity became increasingly politicized in the 1990s. The most direct manifestation of
this politicization was legislation: two major laws concerning European national identity
and the movement of peoples were put in effect in 1992 and 1995, respectively. The first
of these was the Maastricht Treaty (Traité de Maastricht), which is notable mainly from a
symbolic standpoint. Before 1992, the collection of (mostly Western European) countries
now known as the European Union was referred to as the European Community, or the
EC. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the name was changed, officially establishing the
European Union of today. 160 This was of course a legal unification, but it was also a
symbolic one, reflective of the individual countries' desire to become part of a singular,
united community that had more power and a heightened standard of living. Just three
years later in 1995, the Schengen Agreements were implemented, which would
henceforth allow members of the European Union to move freely across national borders
without a passport. 161 Allowing for this kind of internal mobility within the European
Union effectively reinforced what the Maastricht Treaty had begun. The EU became a
united and powerful conglomerate community, in practice and in theory.
The consolidation of the European Union had important implications for
immigration. Both the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreements resulted in a
redefinition of borders, eliminating them on the inside and erecting them on the outside.
The European Union became an effectual "fortress," allowing its inhabitants complete
internal mobility while at the same time discouraging access from the outside: "The
Schengen agreements contributed to the creation of fortress Europe, whose philosophical
160
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(and therefore political and practical) goal was increased freedom within the Schengen
bloc and reinforced control on the supranational border line." 162 So its motivations were
twofold: to facilitate circulation of goods and people internally, and to heighten security
externally. In her book entitled Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest,
Rosello discusses the way in which this legislation can be perceived as hostile to non-EU
members: "Europe is constantly stressing the concept of 'freedom of movement' within its
redefined borders, which means increasing controls on the outskirts of its new symbolic
territory, in a general atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion that treats all nonEuropeans...as potentially undesirable parasites." 163 In this way, the Maastricht Treaty
and the Schengen Agreements, though not overtly concerned with immigration, can be
perceived as hostile to the process.
A third piece of legislation, however, was overtly hostile to the immigration
process. The Pasqua Laws of 1993 (named after French Ministère de l'Intérieur Charles
Pasqua) restricted immigration in a variety of ways: it "prohibit[ed] foreign graduates
from accepting job offers by French employers and den[ied] them a stable residence
status," "increas[ed] the waiting period for family reunification from one to two years,"
and "den[ied] residency permits to foreign spouses who had been illegally in the country
prior to marrying." 164 The Pasqua Laws, some of the most repressive anti-immigration
measures ever to be implemented in France, constituted a drastic shift in French
immigration policy: "The so-called Pasqua laws became the most obvious manifestation
of the French government's anti-immigration attitude. They reflected an increasingly
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repressive and restrictive philosophy, turning the clandestin (illegal immigrant) into an
enemy of the state, the most easily identifiable national scapegoat." The laws delivered
the message loud and clear: France was not only no longer favorable to immigration; it
was actively discouraging it with definitive legal measures.
The Laws also had far-reaching effects for migrants whose means to a residency
permit had been negated in the process: "These repressive measures rendered formerly
legal migration flows illegal. Thus today...there are still many people living in France
known as inexpulsables-irrégularisables. This group...cannot be expelled, yet it not
eligible for residency permits." 165 This is yet another group of people living within
France's borders that has found itself between cultural identities. Since they were legal
migrants to begin with, they cannot be formally asked to return to their countries of
origin. So they continue to live in a country that will never extend them citizenship
rights. Even if they speak flawless, beautiful French and are highly involved in their
communities--even if they are in all ways indistinguishable from the "native French"
among whom they live--they will never be able to identify themselves as legal French
citizens.
This shift in French immigration policy has its roots in a broader political context;
namely, the rise of the far right political party the Front National. Born of the postwar
neo-fascist group Ordre Nouveau, the Front National (or National Front, as it is called in
English) officially appeared on the French political scene in 1972. It did not gain much of
a following until the late 1970s, when Jean-Marie Le Pen gave the party a complete
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"ideological and organizational renewal." 166 Le Pen's name has been inextricably linked
with the party every since. The Front National enjoyed a particular surge in popularity in
the early 90s, when the increased North African and Muslim presence in France brought
the party's anti-immigration campaign to the forefront.
Anti-immigration and nationalism have always been hallmarks of the far right, but
Le Pen was able to frame the specific "issue" of immigration in a way that capitalized on
French anxieties about their increasingly multi-racial, pluralistic society: "Immigration
[became] a sort of shorthand for a complex pattern of concerns--the fear of
unemployment, of housing problems, rising crime, AIDS, drug abuse, and uncertainties
about France's place in the world and the meaning of what it is to be French." 167 Even
though major migration flows to France had slowed considerably by the 1990s, postwar
North African immigrants were very present in French society. Because the majority of
these migrants were a) black, b) Arab, and/or c) Muslim, they made much of the "native"
French population uneasy: "Immigration, in this populist view, was presented as a rising
tide of mainly North African and Muslim faces." 168
Some simply did not know how to go about reconciling these racial and religious
differences with traditional French values, while others (like Le Pen) were simply
unwilling to try. The Front National's ingenious solution was to stem immigration flows
altogether: "Politicians...responded by arguing in favor of 'immigration zéro," and the
right-wing coalition that came into power in 1993 translated the principle of zero
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immigration into policy." 169 The policies that eventually resulted were the 1993 Pasqua
Laws, a testament to how influential Le Pen and the Front National could be. By pointing
a finger at immigration, Le Pen was feeding off a powerful set of anxieties that had
already begun to formulate in French society. The discourse of the Front National was
thus a major turning point in the political redefinition of immigration in the 1990s. The
immigration zéro movement established a powerful precedent for thinking about
immigration in a strictly political context, at the exclusion of all other frameworks or
contexts in which it could be considered. As Rosello states, "When the analogy between
the guest and the immigrant means that the individual is supposed to take it for granted
that his or her own foreign guests are undesirable parasites, then it becomes urgent to
point out that...the choice of the metaphor is subjected to political agendas." 170 To this
day, France has been largely unable to recover these alternative frameworks: immigration
remains principally a political issue in the public eye.
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VI. Les Années Explosives: The Headscarf Affair and Banlieue Violence, 2000-2012
The politicization of immigration in France was, partly, what allowed a set of
virulent clashes to develop in the early 2000s. One was ideological while the other was
physical, but they both had an extremely strong impact on French national identity and
France's interpretation and perception of immigration in a modern context.
The first was, in effect, a clash between the growing presence of Muslims in
France and French notion of secularism. Throughout the postcolonial period, the number
of Muslims in France had been steadily increasing. Most Muslim immigrants hailed from
the North African countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, but a sizeable number
came to the métropole from French territories like Mayotte and La Réunion. 171 As early as
the 1980's, the Muslim presence in French society (as well as the North African
immigrant presence more generally) began to cause anxiety among the native French
people. They were unused to being surrounded by so much racial and religious
difference, and they felt that their own French national identity was being threatened in
the face of so much change: "Politicians, public intellectuals, and the media responded to
the fact of a growing population of Muslim 'immigrants' in their midst--immigrants
whose diversities were reduced to a single difference that was then taken to be a threat to
the very identity of the nation." 172
This anxiety ultimately manifested itself as a preoccupation with the wearing of
the Islamic headscarf, or hijab. In 1989, three young girls were asked to remove their
headscarves in the halls of their public middle school in Creil (an impoverished Parisian
suburb). The girls refused, and were promptly expelled from the school on the grounds
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that they had failed to uphold laïcité (the French version of secularism). 173 Being the first
of its kind, this event quickly spiraled into the media: "What would at other times have
been a minor incident--a school principal disciplining a few of his students--quickly
became a major media event, tapping into, and at the same time inflaming, public
uneasiness about the place of North African immigrants and their children in French
society." 174 The principal's decision became so controversial that it was presented to the
Conseil d'Etat for consideration a month later. After a short while, the court reached a
decision regarding the matter: "The wearing of signs of religious affiliation by students in
public schools was not necessarily incompatible with the principle of laïcité, as long as
these signs were not ostentatious or polemic...[and did not interfere] with the liberties of
other students." 175
Public interest and media commentary upon the affair calmed down after the
decision was reached, but France had not seen the last of the "headscarf affair." In 1994,
right-wing politician Eugène Chénier stirred the pot again when he proposed a bill that
would "ban all 'ostentatious' signs of religious affiliation." He campaigned so
convincingly for the bill that the minister of education, François Bayrou, eventually
signed on: "François Bayrou decreed on September 20, 1994 that 'ostentatious' signs of
religious affiliation would henceforth be prohibited in all schools." 176 This decision was
again presented to the Conseil d'Etat, and (based on the 1989 ruling) it was again
173
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overturned. But the seeds of discontentment had been officially planted, and the tension
between laïcité and the wearing of the headscarf in public schools continued to attract
public attention. 177
On March 15th, 2004, the government passed a law that banned young women
and girls from wearing the headscarf in public schools definitively.
The language used was as follows: "In public elementary, middle and high schools, the
wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students' religious affiliations
is prohibited." 178 Technically, the law applies to religious symbols in a general sense. But
in light of the ongoing controversy about the headscarf and laïcité in public schools, there
was little doubt that it was directed primarily at Muslim students.
The passage of this law elicited immediate, violent reactions from the national
press, the international press, and the general public. Some believed that laïcité should be
enforced at all costs, and thus supported the government's decision. Others maintained
that banning the headscarf was discriminatory and unjust for Muslims, and that it
eliminated what could have been a lesson in open-mindedness and diversity for nonMuslim students. Still others believed that the government's energy had been misdirected
altogether, and that it continued to shy away from the real issues at hand. Wassyla
Tamzali suggests that policymakers should have focused more on the individual women
and girls in question rather than the impersonal, highly politicized relationship between
the headscarf and laïcité: "The French National Assembly preferred to open a national
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debate about laïcité, and as such lost an occasion to confront head-on...the question of the
equality of the sexes in France." 179
Tamzali's idea is an interesting one because it gets at the heart of the kind of
"scapegoating" that has become common in the French government's treatment of
immigration in the past decade. The debate about the banning of the headscarf in public
schools still persist in today's France, and many writers and researchers attribute this
ongoing preoccupation to a set of deeply-rooted societal (and indeed, global) anxieties
that have not yet been dealt with. Bowen asserts that "Anxieties about security and
integration underlie the series of state efforts to manage Islam," 180 and Wallach Scott
corroborates this statement: "Events in Iran, Israel/Palestine, Algeria, New York City,
Afghanistan, and Iraq certainly contributed to anxiety about the place of Muslims in
France." 181 In other words, the "headscarf affair" is actually about a lot more than just
headscarves. Global events such as 9/11 have permanently linked Islam with terrorism in
the minds of many, and constant talk about national security and the division between the
West and the East only serves to fuel anti-Muslim sentiment: "The radical acts of a few
politically inspired Islamists have become a declaration of the intent of many; the
religious practices of minorities have been taken to stand for the 'culture' of the whole." 182
France's desire to eliminate Islamic religious symbols in the public sphere can thus be
viewed as a manifestation of these kinds of fundamental societal and global anxieties.
Wallach Scott takes the argument even further, proposing that past anxieties also
play into the overwhelming interest in the "headscarf affair." She suggests that a French
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fear of Islam is part of the Franco-Algerian War heritage, and that today's disapproval of
the headscarf is linked to acts of terrorism carried out by the FLN during the War: "By
1958, the FLN was using veiled women to transport weapons and bombs past security
checkpoints, so unveiling women was a way of depriving the rebels of a convenient
disguise." 183 Memories of the all-out massacre that was the Franco-Algerian War continue
to weigh heavily on the French nation, so Wallach Scott's argument is compelling. It is
perfectly plausible that the French people would have an unconscious association
between the headscarf and terrorism established in their minds, which would account for
the government's ardent desire to eliminate the headscarf in public schools.
It was exactly these kinds of anxieties within the national body that sparked a
series of violent conflicts between French police and banlieue youth in November of
2005. It all began in Clichy-Sous-Bois, a particularly derelict and impoverished Parisian
banlieue with a high migrant population. While patrolling the area, French police stopped
to ask a group of young men of color for their cartes d'identité (ID cards). Afraid of
police harassment, the young men fled, and the officers followed close behind. The chase
ended abruptly when two of the men were electrocuted to death after seeking refuge in an
electric transformer. When news of the deaths became public, the banlieue went wild
with anger: "When two of [the men]--of Mauritanian and Tunisian origin, respectively-died there by accidental electrocution, many in the banlieues were quick to blame their
deaths on aggressive policing and took to the streets to demonstrate their anger." 184 Bands
of teenagers and young adults threw projectiles and burned cars, police stations, and other
public buildings. Police officers responded brutally, wielding batons and spraying tear
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gas to disperse the riot. As newspaper headlines around the world would proclaim in days
to come, France was burning.
The riots in the Parisian banlieues continued for nearly a month. Things got so
bad that Jacques Chirac's government declared a state of emergency, invoking a law that
had been inactive for a full fifty years: "Chirac's government...declared a state of
emergency, using a 1955 law passed during France's colonial war in Algeria that permits
the imposition of a curfew and suspension of civil liberties, including those of the press,
and permits detention without trial, the use of military tribunals and bans on public
meetings." 185 When the chaos died down, the Republic found itself face-to-face with
some very difficult questions. There was clearly pent-up animosity and tension between
French police officers and the youth in the banlieue, but how and why did the tension
come to a breaking point in the way it did?
According to Michel Wieviorka, the answer is twofold. In his book entitled
Violence en France, Wieviorka distinguishes between two different types of violence.
The first, violence physique, is physical violence. This is violence in its most basic sense:
hitting, kicking, breaking things, throwing projectiles, etc., and these are the actions that
the word "violence" most readily connotes. The second type of violence is violence
symbolique, or symbolic violence. This can take a wide variety of forms: spoken or
written comments, deprivation of rights, stereotypes, or any other non-physical form of
racism or general discrimination. It is this type of violence that Wieviorka most closely
associates with the experience of banlieue youth: "The banlieue youth who break into
riots or who are carried by hate or rage constantly define themselves according to the
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symbolic violence they endure; the contempt, the negation of their person which first and
foremost constitutes racism and social discrimination." 186
Wieviorka's quote reveals the way in which symbolic violence tends to eventually
give way to physical violence. Enduring intense discrimination or marginalization on a
regular basis causes anger and resentment to build up over time, and it continues to build
and build until one day the individual can take it no longer. The internalized feelings the
individual has been holding in then spill over into an externalized rage, which often takes
the form of physical violence. This was exactly what happened with the banlieue youth
during the November 2005 riots in Clichy-Sous-Bois. The combination of a lifetime of
geographical isolation, religious and racial discrimination, and meager opportunities for
advancement was the symbolic violence they suffered, and they bore its weight until they
could bear it no longer: "The behaviors of youth urban violence are the product of a
refused recognition of the unbearable conviction that society is closed...here, violence
indicates the desire to modify a situation that has become intolerable." 187
During the 2005 riots, French police officers were the most obvious targets of this
violence. But they were not the sole targets, and the fact that youth violence was also
directed elsewhere is telling. In addition to police officers' physical person, rioters
targeted police cars and other public, government-sanctioned spaces. Banks and post
offices, for instance, were targeted because of their close affiliation with the State. So,
for the purposes of the rioters, police officers were merely symbolic. As living, breathing
representatives of State power, the gendarmes were easy objects upon which banlieue
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youth could take out their anger and frustration: the problem they were having was not
solely with the cops, but with the French nation itself.
The way that then-Ministre de l'Intérieur Nicolas Sarkozy spoke about the youth
involved in the riots made the problem even worse, if that were indeed possible. He
publicly described the rioters as "racaille," which roughly translates to the word "scum"
in English. Many of the youth participating in the banlieue riots were children of
immigrants or immigrants themselves, so Sarkozy's language can be seen as directly
inflammatory on a number of social fronts, and the comment caused quite a bit of public
outrage when it was first made. The term was so offensive, in fact, that Sarkozy was
asked to retract the comment on numerous occasions: "Pressed repeatedly to retract the
term racaille, Sarkozy declined numerous opportunities to do so...Instead, he stated,
'Voyous ou racailles, je persiste et signe' ['Hoodlums or Scum, I stand by every
word']." 188 Sarkozy's comments are a perfect example of the kind of symbolic violence
that gave rise to the 2005 riots in the first place. Hearing oneself being grouped with the
"hoodlums" and "scum" of the banlieue only heightens one's sense of anger and
indignation at the exclusion one faces, so by making inflammatory comments Sarkozy is
only exacerbating the very situation he seeks to resolve.
Neither this controversy nor the headscarf controversy has been put to rest in
today's France. The French Muslim population is higher than ever ("Paris proper is 10-15
percent Muslim, Marseille 25 percent, and Roubaix, near Lille, 50 percent" 189), but
despite these statistics Muslims in France continue to be marginalized. The French
government continues to hide behind the principle of laïcité to justify the banning of the
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headscarf in public schools, and Islam--regardless of sect or ideology--continues to carry
a stigma. Unrest in French banlieues has persisted, resurfacing most notably in 2008 and
flaring up marginally in the years that followed. The solution that the French government
has pursued thus far for both French Muslims and banlieue youth is "integration," but
even this term begs some critical thinking and analysis. The government must give
further serious consideration to the question of how to move forward in order to best
incorporate these groups, because for now, first, second, and third-generation Muslim
migrants and youth living in the banlieue remain firmly on the margins of the French
society that they try continuously to access.
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Comment Procéder? Integration Policy, Terminology, and Collective Memory: A
Conclusion in Three Parts
i. Integration Policy
Through the re-writing of the European Constitution, the Amsterdam Treaty of
1997 mandated that all European Union member states develop more sophisticated
immigration and integration policies. 190 Immigration policies were nothing new, but
integration policies were, as of yet, practically unheard of. So each country set about
crafting its own integration policy, designed to provide migrants with avenues by which
they could attain a higher level of cultural proficiency than they arrived with.
France implemented an integration policy that requires a variety of different steps:
first, all migrants must sign a Reception and Integration Contract (CAI: contrat d'accueil
et d'intégration) upon arrival. They must then attend a mandatory half-day Welcome
Session (plate-forme d'accueil) and a full day of Civic Training (Formation Civique).
Depending on their level of cultural proficiency, some must also attend a full day session
providing information about living in France (Session d'Information Vivre en France). If
the migrant is determined to be professional between the ages of 18 and 55, he or she
must attend a Skills Assessment (Bilan de compétences). Finally, all migrants must attend
language-training courses until they have achieved a level A1.1 according to the Common
European Framework of Reference. 191
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All of this was, doubtless, a step in the right direction. Hundreds of thousands of
migrants arrive in host countries in the European Union every day, but huge numbers of
these migrants do not speak the language and are completely unfamiliar with their new
country's cultural customs. Barred by both their literacy level and their lack of access to
computers, migrants have done various degrees of research on basic things like climate,
dress, and diet. Some--particularly refugees who are forced to leave their home country in
a hurry--have done no planning at all, and show up in countries like France without even
a jacket to keep them warm in the wintertime. Because of all of these factors, integration
programs are indispensable: they allow the migrant to attain a functional level of cultural
proficiency, and the migrant in turn becomes more of an asset to the state.
This exchange presupposes a model in which immigration is framed as a reciprocal
process: the migrant benefits from the host country and the host country benefits from the
migrant. In order to have this happen, however, the integration programs must be tailored
to fit migrants' needs. They must be sufficiently clear and straightforward so as to allow
all language levels to benefit from their offerings, and the information they impart must
be chosen very carefully by the state. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. The
countries in the European Union dispose of integration policies that are in various stages
of completion, even today. Countries that have had historically low rates of immigration,
like Spain, use very loosely based, decentralized integration programs that vary from
region to region, while countries like France impose integration requirements that are
much more structured and much more involved.
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Even these more sophisticated integration programs contain deficiencies that need
to be addressed. Le Sécrétariat Général à l'Immigration et à l'Intégration, under the
auspices of the Ministère de l'intérieur, is the government agency responsible for
devising and furnishing integration materials for migrants arriving in France. Among
these materials are PowerPoint presentations, videos, booklets, pamphlets, and other
handouts containing information about the France's demographics, its history, and its
values (to name a few elements). After producing these materials, the ministry (in
conjunction with l'OFII, l'Office Française de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration) arranges
a variety of trainings (formations) at which these materials are disseminated to the
migrants in attendance.
During the summer of 2011, the materials the Ministère was using to help migrants
complete these mandatory trainings were sorely lacking. The PowerPoint presentation
(the main feature at both the Formation Civique and the Formation Vivre en France)
contained information regarding important legal processes for migrants that was out of
date and therefore incorrect. The formatrice, or trainer, was unaware that she was
presenting incorrect information and proceeded with her training as usual. The
presentations were conducted entirely in French save for the presence of a single
translator, who translated into one alternative language. The alternative language was not
necessarily the native language of all migrants in attendance, but the Ministère and l'OFII
tried as best they could to pair like groups of migrants with the appropriate translators.
This meant that if large numbers of (for example) Russian-speaking migrants happened to
attend the same training, they would be assigned a Russian translator. But if a couple of
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native Persian speakers whose French wasn't up to par found themselves among that
group, they were essentially out of luck.
Adequate secondary materials such as notepaper and pens were also inconsistently
distributed to migrants during the trainings. Both trainings are designed to last a full day,
so there are large amounts of important information being presented to those in
attendance. Some of the contact numbers, agencies, and resources listed on the
PowerPoint slides are absolutely indispensable to migrants, as they provide links to
information about things like public education, taxes, housing, and the recognition of
foreign qualifications. Given the sheer volume of what is being communicated, it is
entirely impossible for the government to expect that migrants remember it all without
being able to take notes, especially given that not all migrants possess a working
knowledge of French. The absence of explanatory reference sheets or "Word Banks" with
regards to the various titles and acronyms of the agencies and offices being mentioned
was also striking. France is (at least, comparatively) an extremely bureaucratic country,
and it is highly difficult for migrants coming in from the outside to understand the
structures of the various organisms to which they must submit paperwork or
documentation in order to get their new lives started. They have no idea what l'ADIL192
or l'AFPA 193 are, and without some kind of a guide to explain it, chances are they are
missing out on some very important information.
To facilitate comprehension, the French government should provide adequate
writing materials (pen, notepaper, and a clipboards) at each and every training to every
migrant in attendance. A reference sheet detailing the contact information that is listed on
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the slideshows should also be distributed, with explanations as to what the purpose of
each agency is and how it can help the migrant further his or her goals. These sheets
could be translated into a multiplicity of different languages and kept permanently on
file, allowing migrants to walk into the training and select whichever translation best
meets their language needs. Trainers (formateurs and formatrices) should be kept up-todate on changing government policies that would affect the accuracy of the information
being delivered, and educational materials should be updated regularly so as to avoid
confusion. Doing all of these things would go a long way in making the actual integration
process in France more effective.

ii. Terminology: "Integration" vs. "Assimilation" and the Power of Language
In addition to these considerations, the French government (and French society in
general) must pay specific attention to the set of vocabulary that is currently being used.
L'intégration seems thus far to be the political watchword of the 21st century, but does
the term really, fundamentally mean? The principal definition given by the Oxford
English Dictionary is the following: "The making up or composition of a whole by adding
together or combining the separate parts or elements; combination into an integral whole:
a making whole or entire." 194 This definition implies a certain harmony to the process of
creating the whole, a certain ease with which the different yet equally important parts fit
together as one. It does not require that the disparate parts change shape or form to have a
place with the rest; rather, it all comes together organically.
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By contrast, the definition of the word "assimilation" does contain the supposition
that the individual, different parts will change in order to fit in. The OED defines
assimilation as "The action of making or becoming like; the state of being like; similarity,
resemblance, likeness." 195 So assimilation differs from integration rather drastically, even
though the two are often used interchangeably as synonyms. The question then becomes,
is the act of integration in France measuring up to its own definition? Wallach Scott does
not think so. She suggests that what the French government is calling integration is
actually just a glorified push for assimilation: "While seeming to wrestle with the various
ways to integrate North Africans into French society, [government policy] actually only
entertained one idea. The standard for becoming French remained what it had long been:
assimilation." 196 Indeed, it would seem that the French model of "integration" would
prefer that the migrant conform completely to the traditional French way of life, shedding
other cultural customs in favor of blending in and becoming indistinguishable from other
members of society.
"Assimilation," then, would seem a more apt term for what the government
actually expects. And if this is the case, the vocabulary needs to be changed. Government
workers must use more honest and more transparent terminology that does not, in
practice, fall short of its own expectations. Asking immigrants to "integrate" when they
are really being asked to "assimilate" creates dismay and disillusionment on the part of
migrants when they realize what they are really being asked to do, building mistrust of
the government and of the nation itself. The migrant feels that he or she has been
purposefully misled, and erects emotional and psychological barriers against the same
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abstract body of the nation that he or she is being asked to integrate into. Integration
programs (as well as other facets of the immigration process) would thus be better
received by migrants and would be more successful if the current vocabulary were
reevaluated.
The Ministère de l'Intérieur's annual Prix de l'Intégration, or "Integration Prize,"
is a perfect example of the French government's misuse of the term. Every year, locally
elected leaders from each département (province) nominate a series of candidates from
their respective areas and submit them to the Ministère for consideration. These
candidates are first, second, or (more recently) third-generation immigrants who are
determined to have "integrated" exceptionally well into French culture. Common criteria
for nominations are education in French schools, impressive professional
accomplishments in France, overcoming past adversity, and involvement in the
community. More concrete benchmarks like achieving fluency in French or becoming
naturalized as a French citizen are also looked upon favorably. Upon receiving the
nominations, the Ministère appoints a committee, which reviews the candidates and
selects the eventual winner. The winner is then nationally recognized at a ceremony held
by the Ministère and provided with a cash prize, the reward for being the Best and Most
Successfully Integrated of them all.
It is apparent that what the Prix de l'Intégration is really celebrating is not
integration, but assimilation. It is not the man who holds a doctorate from a school in
Algeria or the woman who attended medical school in Lebanon who will win the prize-after all, holders of foreign degrees are not a direct reflection of the French state. It is the
person who has "escaped" adversity in his or her home country and who comes to France
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to better him or herself that the government is looking to choose. It is these candidates,
who have used all of the ressources incroyables available in belle France to pull
themselves up by their bootstraps that are the desirable ones, because they reflect
positively on the "integration" work that the government is doing. By holding a public,
national competition such as this one, the French government is not only grossly
misrepresenting the term "integration" but also earning the disdain of a great many
migrants. They resent having their own accomplishments fall short of others who might
have taken a more traditionally "French" route to success, and rightfully so: each
migrant's parcours is unique, and should not be objectified and compared to that of
another.
Politicians must also pay particular attention to the language they are using to
refer to immigration during speeches and debates. The politician is, by nature, a public
figure. The members of French society--and indeed, of any society--count on their public
figures to be a barometer for public opinion. So the vocabulary that politicians use is
especially important, because it shapes (whether consciously or unconsciously) the way
that the whole of society thinks about and interprets any given issue. Rosello, who has
studied political discourse and immigration in France extensively, points out that political
rhetoric all too often contains underlying and misleading information about immigration:
"Political discourses seem to invite us to treat immigrants as if 'France', the country,
functioned like a self-contained private house where the owner receives a relative...the
representatives of the state, in their political speeches, speak as though France is the
house and the immigrants, the Guest, with a capital G." 197
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Setting up binary representations in speech such as the one Rosello mentions has
very dangerous implications. The power of language in determining the reality of a
situation is all too often underestimated, and this has definitely been the case with the
binaries that have been employed by politicians in France to describe immigration. So a
new vocabulary must again be sought, one that will not perpetuate a series of reductive
and therefore unproductive binary oppositions.

iii. Collective Memory: The Importance of Moving Forward
Finally, the government must continue to encourage honest and open discussion
about the traumatic events that have taken place in France's past. The Franco-Algerian
War was one of the single most traumatic events in French history, and the deep
psychological wounds that it resulted in continue to inform the way that North African
immigrants are viewed in France today: "The conflict between white French society and
the country's minorities has roots in the bitter legacy of the Algerian war of independence
from French rule more than four decades ago." 198 The connection between current the
French perception of immigration and France's colonial history in Algeria is undeniable,
but it is one that goes largely unspoken, even 50 years after the War's end.
In 1999, the French government officially acknowledged that a war in Algeria had
taken place, but it has yet to issue a formal apology for having systematically tortured
and killed thousands of indigenous Algerians and FLN party members. This lack of
apology persists despite campaign promises made to the public by Nicolas Sarkozy in
2007: "Sarkozy promised that, once in power, he would officially recognise France's
198
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'responsibility in the abandonment and killing of harkis and thousands of other Muslims
who trusted France, so the forgotten will not be killed again.' Five years later, members
of various pied-noir and harkis associations are still waiting for that apology." 199 Adel
Gastel of France 24 News points out that, furthermore, the digital French Archives on the
subject are sorely lacking: "The website explanation ends with an abrupt, 'During this
period, the bloodshed continued and affected all communities: Europeans and Muslims,
civilians and military.' In one concise line, the trauma of a generation and the birth pains
of a new nation have been summarised." 200 The description is four short paragraphs in
total.
This shroud of silence must be lifted before France will be able to resolve the
tensions regarding immigrants that exist in the national body. A lack of verbalization of
intense emotions like pain and guilt has been damning for any kind of progress between
immigrants and the French government that might otherwise have been made. It is silence
that has allowed this pain and guilt to deepen, and it is silence that spawns resentmentfueled episodes like the 2005 riots in the French banlieues. Officially apologizing for the
practice of torture during the Franco-Algerian War would pave the way for a healing
dialogue, not only on a national level but also on an individual level. In the meantime,
public platforms such as the French Archives website should consider it their duty to
provide as much accurate and honest information as possible about the events of the War.
Four paragraphs is not a sufficient length for an account of the Franco-Algerian War, and
abbreviating its history only heightens the taboo nature of the subject in the public space.
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Encouraging dialogue about the War would go far to assuage the vaults of
collective pain, shame, and guilt that continue to be felt in today's France. And
encouraging critical, honest dialogue about French national identity outside of the
political sphere would do wonders to improve the perception and treatment of immigrant
populations. As Wallach Scott states, "[France] need[s] to come up with new ways of
addressing difference, ways that acknowledge its existence rather than refusing to engage
it. The old ways, the insistence on sameness and assimilation, aren't working." 201 France
has come far from its Revolutionary prototype of 1789 "in which all souls would grow
larger through the continual communication of republican sentiments," 202 and it is only
through continued dialogue and the eventual acceptance of its past that France will be
able to move forward.
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CISLA Addendum
Immigration is not, in itself, a modern phenomenon. Some of the earliest peoples
to walk this planet were nomadic, and did not consider themselves defined and bound by
geographical borders in quite the same way that we do today. What is modern about
immigration, however, are the perceptions associated with it. The way that each
individual country perceives and approaches immigration in the modern context is very
intricately bound up with sentiments about its own national identity, and in a world that
is seemingly more and more of a sprawling colossus every day, it can be difficult for a
country to navigate its place in it.
It is from here that my interest, and my topic for my Senior Honors Thesis, arises.
I have undertaken to examine, in a very broad sense, the perception of immigration in
France. This topic allows for consideration of a wide array of factors that are relevant to
the discussion of immigration in contemporary France: things like integration, housing,
religious differences, police and youth violence, and cultural anxiety. In writing this
addendum, I am going to take the liberty of allowing my subject to remain similarly
broad. I will endeavor to apply the third CISLA question, about material, spiritual, and
ethical challenges, to immigration in France today, and in doing so I will touch on a wide
array of points. It is my hope that the ensemble of these points will contribute to a
robustness of vision that will help you, the reader, understand some of the things that my
Thesis is really, fundamentally about.
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The material challenges that come with immigration to France are manifold. First
and foremost, there is the issue of housing. Housing and overcrowding have long since
been major problems in densely populated areas of France, like Lyon and the entire
département of Ile-de-France (the département that encompasses Paris and its environs).
The concern about housing began in the early 1960's, when France received an influx of
migrants from its former African colonies. These migrants, who already spoke the French
language, arrived seeking a whole slew of new prospects: better jobs, better living
conditions, better opportunities for their offspring, and generally better lives. They
already spoke the French language, but most of them had never been to France before,
and they were enchanted with the romantic vision of the country that spans the globe. In
keeping with this vision, the vast majority of these migrants headed for Paris, eager for
les grands jardins in the spring, the bustling boulevards, and the sparkling lights of the
Eiffel Tower.
These things were not, however, what they found. The French government's
response to this wave of migration was to expand on their collection of HLM. HLM, or
habitation à loyer modéré (rent-controlled apartments), seemed to be the perfect solution
to prevent what would otherwise be a housing crisis: they were expansive, inexpensive to
construct, and affordable for immigrants. And, initially, the HLM functioned quite well as
the go-to solution for immigrant housing. But today, it is quite a different story. Many of
the HLM were not properly kept over the years, and as a result are now extremely
dilapidated and dirty. Spatial and social isolation have also made the HLMs incredibly
desolate places to live. Cut off from outlets of culture and social interaction (like movie
theaters, shopping malls, and museums), the inhabitants of the HLMs are more likely to

97

experience depression and general cultural disillusionment. Crime in the banlieues
(suburbs) where the HLMs are located has also become a very real problem. Recognizing
that the HLMs no longer provide immigrants and their families with acceptable living
conditions, the French government has begun to raze certain complexes. But financial
(and, dare I say, bureaucratic) constraints have prevented hundreds of HLMs from being
inspected and razed.
In this way, the challenge of immigrant housing is a double-edged sword: not only
is it a material challenge, but it is an ethical challenge as well. Given the miserable state
of a large number of the HLMs, immigrant housing becomes quite an exploitative
process. The reality of it is that the majority of migrants who arrive in France already
have extremely limited financial and cultural capital, so their options for finding housing
and paying for that housing are extremely narrow. The HLMs are, in most cases, the only
thing that is financially feasible, especially where whole immigrant families with many
mouths to feed are concerned. So if there is only one option, and if that option isn't
suitable to live in by anyone's standards (least of all the members of the government that
created it), where is there left to go? And where does the line get drawn--to what extent is
the French government responsible for securing migrants (particularly non-refugees) with
housing? What should the standards for HLM housing be?
Another material challenge facing immigration to the EU in general is the
financing of integration programs. The European Union stipulates that all of its member
countries must have some sort of integration policy in effect for immigrants, but what it
does not explicitly stipulate is which party--the State or the migrants themselves--should
bear the brunt of the expenses. This also becomes an ethical question. Is it really okay to

98

make immigrants, who are typically coming from extremely economically disadvantaged
areas, pay any sum of money for an integration program? Especially when it is the host
country, and not the migrant, that deems the integration process necessary in the first
place.
It is true that the integration process that the host country has put in place usually
ends up benefitting the migrant, improving (among other things) their language skills and
overall employability. But I spent all summer studying the various integration programs
that are in place in the European Union, and it is my opinion that not all of them are
developed enough to justify asking a migrant to pay several hundred Euros in order to
participate. The variability of the quality and character of the integration programs across
the EU member countries is huge, and as of yet there is no real regulating body that holds
the member countries' programs to an established set of standards. France's integration
program happens to be free of charge for migrants, which is wonderful.
Even from here, though, another ethical question arises: is it okay to mandate that
immigrants integrate into the host country? Because (at least, in the European Union)
integration is not a choice: it is a pre-requisite that migrants must fulfill in order to obtain
a residence permit. The widely accepted answer to the "is integration ethical" question is
yes. The French government claims that it regards integration as a reciprocal process,
necessitating efforts from both the State and the migrant him or herself. But in the case of
France, the State doesn't give as much as the migrant does. Yes, it provides an integration
program that is free for migrants. Yes, it provides expedited and specialized programs for
asylum seekers. But while the migrant is, in most cases, striving to integrate into French
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society and working incredibly hard to get a job, find housing, and learn the French
language, the State remains incredibly ideologically closed-minded.
The perception of immigration in France, even by government workers, continues
to be shockingly negative, and this perception is perpetuated by the extremely rigid
definition of national identity that the State continues to promote. Liberté, Egalité,
Fraternité: Freedom, Equality, and Brotherhood. It's all well and good when it's sounded
from the hills, but if certain populations living in France are being left out of the
equation, it isn't really functioning the way it should. So the way the State has been
framing French national identity is actually contributing to a lack of reciprocity within
the integration process for migrants. They are essentially trying to integrate into a society
whose State-established self-definition already excludes them.
The spiritual challenges associated with immigration to France are also manifold,
and, like the material challenges, are riddled with ethical questions. The debate about the
foulard (the headscarf, or hijab) in France has received a lot of publicity in recent years,
and so will serve as an appropriate and relevant example. But in order to fully understand
the debate surrounding the headscarf, one must first understand the concept of laïcité.
Laïcité, or secularism, has an incredible importance in French life. For the French, it is
much more than just a practice, like it is in the United States; rather, it is a deeply valued
and deeply ingrained way of life, that factors into the makeup of their very identifies. So
when the government passed a law in 2004 that banned the wearing of the hijab in public
schools, it did not foresee the law as being particularly problematic, because it was in
accordance with the principles of laïcité. As it turned out, the law was intensely
problematic. It infuriated a lot of people--Muslims, some French, and international
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onlookers--who thought that the law was unjust. The law became fringed with ethical
questions: does disallowing the headscarf in academic spaces constitute a breach of
individual rights? Is it reasonable to expect, as the French government does, that the
public space always remain secular, and that only the private space be used for religiosity
and faith?
The opponents of the anti-headscarf law pointed out that there was a double
standard in play. Visible signs of Islamic faith, like the headscarf, were prohibited in
schools, but visible signs of Christian or Jewish faith (like crosses and kippahs) were not.
The statements that various French politicians made concerning the law also angered
them. The politicians claimed that the headscarf was symbolic of the oppression of
women by a patriarchal society, and that what they were really doing by passing the law
was enforcing the French principle of Egalité. The counter-argument to this statement is
that not all women wear the headscarf for the same reasons. Yes, it can be a symbol of
the subjugation of women. But some (many) women who wear the headscarf today
choose to wear it of their own volition. In this way, the headscarf can also be viewed as a
symbol of women's empowerment. All in all, it is an incredibly complicated and sensitive
issue that France is still grappling with today.
All of these things that I have mentioned are inarguable challenges that today's
France faces. And they are difficult challenges to confront and to reconcile, especially
because immigration has become such a highly politicized issue just about everywhere.
But immigration can be every bit as much an advantage and an opportunity as it is a
"problem." Approaching it from a humanitarian standpoint would go a long way in
destigmatizing immigration in today's France. Because ultimately, when you put aside
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things like racism and xenophobia, immigration is just groups of humans who desire a
change.
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